THEOLOGY

VOL. XLII MARCH, 1941 No. 249

EDITORIAL

THE last number of this journal had to go to press before the meeting of the Archbishop of York's conference at Malvern. The conference was summoned in order to "consider from the Anglican point of view what are the fundamental facts which are directly relevant to the ordering of the new society, and how Christian thought can be shaped to play a leading part in the reconstruction". We are glad that the papers read at the conference are to be published in book form, and comment on them may therefore be deferred. They were for the most part of great value, although it was difficult to believe that they had been prepared with so large a conference in view. The way in which the conference was arranged, its membership constituted, and its proceedings conducted, has come in for a good deal of criticism; but perhaps the less said about those matters the better, now that it is known that they have given rise to great dissatisfaction. Nor do we propose to discuss in detail the document of conclusions which was unexpectedly submitted to the conference, and which seemed to summarize what many Christians have been saying for some time. The numerous propositions which it contains were designed to register a "general agreement". The publication of such an agreement does, however, in itself provoke two serious reflections of general interest.

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Underlying this general agreement it was not difficult to discern a very serious measure of fundamental disagreement. One person whom we met some weeks after the conference said: "What is the real truth about Malvern? Everybody I've met who was there[1] says it was dreadful, but each one seems to have disapproved of the proceedings for quite

[1] They were presumably drawn from the critical minority, and not from the approving majority, of the members of the conference. The Provost of Coventry estimates that this minority was about 10 per cent. of the whole (*Church of England Newspaper*, February 7, 1941).

different and incompatible reasons." The chief mark of the conference was in fact incoherence; and the morality of concealing this beneath a general agreement, which could hardly have been compassed except for the skill of the chairman, deserves attention. This kind of thing has been the bane of official Anglicanism for a long time, and it is lamentable that a gathering which was not intended to be official and which, indeed, rumbled with discontent against the official leadership of the Church, should have allowed itself to provide another example of this deception.[1] By all means register agreement where significant agreement exists, but make it your business also to expose the roots of disagreement as long as they are there. It is the latter task which has been shown by contributions to this journal during the last year or so to be the more pressing and also the more difficult. We need to sharpen and deepen our capacity for fundamental theological discussion. An American divine who visited England a few years ago is reported to have said: " What this country needs is a first-rate theological controversy." It would be no less true to say that the Church of England needs to be summoned or driven to theological repentance.

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We must rid ourselves of the idea that there is something inherently uncharitable in theological controversy. There may be safety in such an idea, but there is no salvation. True charity demands truthfulness, and makes for conditions in which controversy can be both disinterested and fruitful. The facile plea that there is truth in all points of view is an easy excuse for declining to wrestle with basic problems. The aversion of many Anglicans to theological controversy is due, we fear, to a lack of deep concern with theology. That lack of concern is not at present being corrected by the way in which men are trained for the ministry; it is being fostered by the complacent way in which clergymen—not least senior clergymen—allow theological study to be crowded out of their daily time-table as though it were not a primary obligation upon them. At a time when an increasing number of laymen are becoming aware of the importance of theology the clergy, whose first concern it

[1] The wording of the only one of the resolutions which did divide the conference was, after it had been passed by a majority, amended so that it could be passed *nemine contradicente*.

should be, often give the impression of wondering what all the bother is about. A letter which we publish in this number, and which in itself may indicate only a trivial instance of neglect, is symptomatic of a grave disease. The Malvern conference ought to have seen that just to publish a general agreement in conditions like these is to whiten a sepulchre. It would be better by far to help people to look inside.

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A second, and not less serious, objection to the Malvern type of proceeding is its irresponsibility. Several eminent members of the conference have assured us that "*of course no one* who was present is individually committed to *any* of its findings".[1] It was not, perhaps, necessary for them to supply this assurance, since the conference followed the familiar course of ecclesiastical assemblies in providing no adequate instrument or resources for carrying into effect its admirable resolutions. The fact that this failing is by no means peculiar to assemblies of Christian people makes the case no better. It is doubtful how far a predominantly clerical assembly could ever be properly qualified to subscribe to a body of conclusions which have a direct bearing on the means as well as the ends of the political, economic and financial systems. Such an assembly is certainly not qualified itself to carry its conclusions into effect. Who, then, is to interpret, apply and disseminate them in the various fields of action? The conference ought to have been reminded again and again of Dr Oldham's pertinent words in *The Resurrection of Christendom*:

> The acid test of our belief in an undertaking is the provision of the means to make it possible. There is all the difference in the world between eloquent talk about the advantages of broadcasting and the establishment of Broadcasting House to achieve those advantages. . . . We should no longer be content to aspire after a more Christian order of society or affirm in resolutions what ought to be done, but should create and provide the resources which will make possible a concerted effort on a new scale (pp. 6 *f.*).

That book contained definite proposals for the initiation of such an effort. Its initiation would depend to a large extent on the support of the Church of England. So far as we know,

[1] Letter to *The Times*, January 22, 1941. Italics ours.

no alternative proposals have been made. This aspect of the matter was almost completely ignored at Malvern; for such an undertaking is obviously beyond the capacity of the Industrial Christian Fellowship (as at present constituted), which was asked to do the " follow-up " work of the conference.

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The conference provided a melancholy revelation of the fact that a large body of Anglicans, who have an enthusiasm for social reform under Christian leadership, have not yet awoken to the lack of integrity which is involved in passing resolutions without providing the means for carrying them out. Ought the conference to have been allowed to break up with the gratifying sense that it had covered a wide field " with some difficulty " and " that the overwhelming majority of those present quite clearly understood the questions they were called upon to decide " ?[1]

[1] See the letter to *The Times* referred to above.

The Nature and Task of Theology—II

What is the Instrument of Theology?

We can now pass on to the third question: What is the instrument by which theology is to work on its material?

Liberal theology would answer that it is simply the human reason. One of the most orthodox of Anglican Liberal theologians could write as follows towards the end of his life: "I have, ever since I was an undergraduate, been certain that I must be in the true sense a free thinker, and that either not to think freely about a disturbing subject, or to accept ecclesiastical authority in place of the best judgment of my own reason, would be for me an impossible treason against the light. I must go remorselessly where the argument leads me."[1] It has been the boast of Liberal theology that it is a purely rational study which can hold its own with any secular science. For it, the truth about religion is to be attained by a quite dispassionate and unbiased investigation of the phenomena of the world in which man finds himself, of the psychological data of the human consciousness and unconsciousness, of the religious practices of man (preferably of backward or prehistoric races), and of the religious documents which have come down from antiquity. Theology, in the only sense in which the word can be taken seriously, is simply one, though presumably the most important one, of the exercises of the human reason.

It is of interest to notice that on this point of the theological instrument, if upon no others, Liberal theology seems to be in agreement with post-medieval scholasticism.[2]

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[1] Charles Gore, *Belief in God*, Preface, Pelican ed., p. 6.

[2] Thus Fr R. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., writes: "Theology is a wisdom of the supernatural order because it necessarily assumes infused faith at its root, since its aim is: (1) to explain or analyse conceptually the revealed truths or truths of faith in order fully to understand them, in contrast to the deformations of heresy; and (2) to *deduce* from them [*d'en déduire*] other truths which are virtually contained in them and which are called theological conclusions in the strict sense, being the fruit of *reasoning* which is not only explanatory but *objectively illative*." Again: "The work of *conceptual analysis* (which is the most important part of theological treatises on the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Sacraments, Grace, etc.) and that of the *deduction* of

Fr Charlier, O.P., in his brilliant *Essai sur le problème théologique*,[1] has argued this in much detail. Taking as examples Cajetan, Bañez and John of St Thomas, he shows how in the later scholastic period the task of theology came to be conceived as simply the elucidation, by rational deduction, of the consequences of the fundamental revealed principles of the Christian religion. These principles have to be accepted simply by the divine virtue of supernatural faith, though reason may prepare the ground by providing preambles to faith and motives of credibility (that is the work of apologetics rather than of theology proper). The scholastic and the Liberal differ vastly in their views as to the material upon which theology should work, but they are in agreement as to the instrument which should be used upon it.

In contrast with the " scholastics " and claiming in his support his master St Thomas, Fr Charlier envisages theology quite differently. " Demonstration," he says, " in the rigid sense of the word, cannot be applied in theology."[2] The theologian is concerned not to demonstrate conclusions from principles, but to make explicit the content of the living tradition of the Church. His success or failure will not depend merely on the acuteness of his intellectual powers, though this will of course play its part, and a very important part. It will depend primarily on his adherence to, and his life in, the Mystical Body of Christ. He will be, as it were, an organ through which the Divine Head Himself

theological conclusions are *a human work performed upon the data of revelation* or *donné révélé* " (*Le sens du mystère et le clair-obscur intellectuel*, pp. 51 *sqq.*, my translation and italics). The author rightly adds that theology occupies an intermediate place between infused faith and metaphysics, and, being rooted in the former, is superior to the latter. His book was published in 1934.

Fr A. Gardeil, O.P., wrote even more strongly: " The science of the ' theologically revealable ' or scholastic theology is as indispensable as the theological science of the ' formally revealed ' or positive theology. . . . The deductive procedure imposes itself upon this kind of science. . . . Scientific theology receives, in the immediate theological datum which is for us only another name for the *donné révélé*, its whole equipment of truth [*sa fourniture totale de vérité*]. Its rôle is to manifest to our direct intuition that which exists implicitly or virtually in a way which escapes us at first sight. *It is concerned with the syllogism* " (*Le donné révélé et la théologie*, pp. 224 *sqq.*, my translation and italics). This was written in 1909.

[1] Published by Ramgal (Thuillies) and Casterman (Paris), 1938.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 137.

may speak. " Theology," Fr Charlier writes, " by reason of its very nature and of its end, has a method of working and a spirit of its own which are neither those of the philosopher nor those of the historian,"[1] and he insists that, while it " uses the historic and the scholastic method as its auxiliaries ",[2] its chief needs are a sense of God and mystery and a supernatural sense of the Church, with which last there goes the sense of the Church's teaching authority, its *magisterium*. " To live supernaturally in the Church and with all the Church is a necessity for the theologian who wishes to be an instrument of the progress of sacred science and a true servant of divine truth."[3] M. Maritain writes to the same effect. " Theology," he says, " is not a simple application of philosophy to revealed data—as many have thought since the time of Descartes. Were this so it would involve submitting the content of faith to human judgment and discernment. Theology is a *habitus* of wisdom rooted in faith: hence it is radically and virtually supernatural, and hence it uses philosophical knowledge as its instrument and judges it in its own light."[4] It is, of course, true that Fr Charlier, as a modern Roman Catholic, interprets the *magisterium* of the Church in a way which few Anglicans would be ready to accept, but we shall, I hope, see that his treatment is strengthened rather than weakened when it is corrected on this point.

I suggest, then, that the instrument which the theologian should use in performing his task is not just his rational faculty, as the post-Thomist scholastics and the Liberals have assumed, but his whole self in its sacramental union with Christ in His Mystical Body; in this, his rational powers, strengthened and illuminated by grace, will, of course, play an organic and controlling part. He is not concerned simply to make deductions from principles or to pass judgment upon the dogmas of the Faith, but to allow himself to be used by the Divine Head of the Mystical Body as an organ through which, in accordance with the will of God for him and for his time, some tiny fraction of the truth which is in Christ may be expressed more clearly. Putting this in terms not of the theologian but of his science, we may say that the task of theology is to display in its fulness and bring to its blossoming the revelation which God has com-

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 153. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 164. [3] *Op. cit.*, p. 158.
[4] *Science and Wisdom*, E.T., p. 113.

mitted to His Church. It will be clear at once how difficult and dangerous, and yet how noble, is the work to which the theologian is called. He will indeed need to use to the utmost whatever intellectual gifts God has endowed him with, but he will need still more the virtues of humility, faith and adherence to Christ. Because he is to express not his own thoughts but those which the Divine Head is thinking in His Mystical Body, of which the theologian is a member, the primary need of the theologian is that he should be living *in the Revelation itself*; that is to say, that he should be living *in Christ*, who is the Eternal Truth and the entire self-utterance of the Father; that he should be living *in the Church* which is Christ's Body, the organism in which Christ, who is Himself the Revelation, dwells now upon earth. A man cannot, of course, be a theologian without being equipped by God with special charismatic gifts for his special vocation, but he can only exercise them rightly by adherence to Christ and Christ's Body. He must, in a word, be a *liturgical man*.[1] For, since the divine Revelation is not in the first place a set of propositions but is Christ Himself, and since Christ abides and acts on earth in His Mystical Body, the theologian is not an external spectator examining the Revelation from outside; he is actually *in the Revelation*. And he is its very partial and fallible organ. *La théologie*, writes Fr Charlier, *est la foi elle-même en travail*.[2]

From what has been said above it will follow that the first fact about the theologian is his baptism, whereby he was made a member of Christ. It will also follow that his theological adequacy will intimately depend upon the maintenance and nourishment of his moral and sacramental union with Christ. His theology is, for example, bound to suffer disastrously if he falls into mortal sin, and even venial sins will impair it. The really great theologian must be a saint as well, and, on the other hand, there are few worse states for a soul to be in than that of the theologian who has fallen from grace and humility, for not only has he stumbled himself, but he may be the cause through which multitudes of others will be made to stumble. It were better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck and that he were drowned in the depth of the sea.

We shall also expect that the theology of those Christian

[1] *Cf.* the way in which this idea is worked out in Dom Theodore Wesseling's admirable book *Liturgy and Life*. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 75.

bodies in which the full sacramental life is lived will express the divine revelation with a fulness and balance which will be lacking in those whose sacramental life is partly or wholly defective. It is not, for example, surprising that the Lutheran and Calvinist bodies have developed a very one-sided doctrine of sin and justification. On the other hand, we are far from being committed to every detail of medieval or post-Tridentine Roman Catholicism. The fact has already been stressed that it is the duty of the theologian to be, as it were, a mouthpiece through which the consciousness of the Mystical Body can find its expression, and this simply because the essence of Christianity is incorporation into the Body of Christ. In the last three centuries, however, Romanism has almost universally defined Christianity as consisting in submission to the Pope—that is, as being a juridical rather than a sacramental fact. (The confusion caused in this way is well exemplified by the uncertainties raised by *Ab acatholicis nati* as to validity of marriages.) And this attitude is not less prominent in the acts and utterances of the great figures of the medieval Papacy: "The Lord Jesus Christ has set up one ruler over all things as His universal Vicar, and as all things in heaven, earth and hell bow the knee to Christ, so should all obey Christ's Vicar, that there be one flock and one shepherd"; "We declare, state, define and pronounce that for every human creature to be subject to the Roman Pope is altogether necessary for salvation."[1] It is therefore not surprising that, in the book already cited, Fr Charlier lays what to an Anglican must seem exaggerated stress upon the *magisterium*, the teaching authority, of the Holy See. It is on the theologian's obedience to this particular embodiment of the *magisterium*, rather than upon the maintenance of his vital and sacramental union with the Mystical Body, that the stress tends to fall as Fr Charlier develops his theme. As a consequence

[1] Innocent III, Boniface VIII; qu. Deanesley, *History of the Medieval Church*, pp. 144, 180. I am indebted to the Rev. T. M. Parker for the example of the domination of medieval theology by canon law and of the medieval habit of interpreting the *sacerdotium* almost entirely in terms of "governing" souls, the *sacerdotium* being thereby assimilated to the *regnum*, the civil power, and then put in contrast with it. He suggests as causes of this the feudalization of the Church due to the necessity of endowment in land, the general Latin concentration on "catholicity" rather than on "orthodoxy", and the struggle with the State which caused the Western Church to adopt to some extent the rôle of a "counter-state."

there is an unresolved tension in his final conclusions which is essentially the same as that between the outward and inward aspects of the Church in Fr Congar's *Divided Christendom*. How real an embarrassment is this concentration on the juridical side of the Church can be seen by asking any Roman Catholic such questions as: Is it baptism or submission to the Pope that makes one a Catholic? Is a baptized Christian who is not in communion with the Pope a bad Catholic or not a Catholic at all? Is the baptized baby of non-Roman-Catholic parents a Catholic or not? (This problem, it must be observed, is quite independent of the question as to whether a Christian *ought* to be in communion with the Pope.) But there are welcome signs in some recent dealings of Roman Catholic authorities with the Eastern Orthodox, as for instance the instructions issued at the beginning of the present war by Mgr Neveu as regards the ministrations of French soldier-priests to Orthodox soldiers, that Rome is itself beginning to look at the matter in a new light.[1]

This is, however, a digression. The point which is being maintained is that the primary task of the theologian is to take his tiny share, from his place in the Mystical Body, in the great task of rendering explicit the revelation committed to the Body by its Head with whom it is united. For, while the process of revelation attained its completion in the manifestation in human flesh of Him who is, simply and finally, Prophet, Priest and King, so that nothing remains to be revealed which was not given in Him, the displaying of all that is involved in that final revelation is one of the great works of the Holy Spirit in the Mystical Body. " Every scribe which is instructed unto the Kingdom of Heaven is like unto a man that is an householder, which bringeth forth *out of his treasure* things new and old."[2] " I have yet many things to say unto you," the Christ told His apostles, " but ye cannot bear them now. Howbeit when he, the Spirit of truth, is come, he will guide you into all truth."[3] Revelation can advance no more, but we can advance within it.

[1] See *Eastern Churches Quarterly*, January, 1940, pp. 23 *sqq.* *Cf.* also " The Organic Conception of the Church and Reunion," by T. M. Parker, THEOLOGY, May, 1940, pp. 369 *sqq.*, and the Bishop of Nassau, THEOLOGY, August, 1940, p. 104. Also Donald Attwater, *The Dissident Eastern Churches*, pp. 341 *sqq.*; M. J. Congar, *Divided Christendom*, pp. 243 *sqq.* [2] Matt. xiii, 52. [3] John xvi, 12, 13.

In addition to this, however, theology has a secondary, but nevertheless a most important, task. This is to illuminate and fertilize the workings of the natural reason and so to bring the sciences of the natural reason to their fructification. The precise bearing of theology upon each science will vary from case to case, as will also the contribution that the science concerned will have to offer to theology;[1] it will increase in weight in proportion as the several sciences approximate in their subject-matter to that of theology itself. Theology will thus have much more to say about the sciences which deal with human beings, who are made in the image of God and are His vicegerents on earth—such sciences, that is, as politics, psychology and the theory of education—than about those, such as physics or mathematics, which deal either with real beings in so far as they are amenable to measurement (*entia realia sub ratione quantitatis*) or with beings that are simply constructs of the reason (*entia rationis cum*, or even *sine*, *fundamento in rebus*). Its influence will be exercised both by its general stabilization and illumination of the natural reason and by its power to indicate the true ends and mutual relations of the various sciences and their relations to theology itself.[2] In so doing, it may once again be allowed to bear its proud title of *Regina scientiarum*, and cease to be looked upon as either one among many studies or a harmless diversion for religious cranks. While it has its own special task to perform, theology has also a reference to every speculative or practical pursuit of man.

Something needs to be said here about the relation of the theologian to the Episcopate, for, however different her interpretation of it may be from that of Roman Curialism,

[1] An excellent example of legitimate influence of a secular science upon theology is provided by the advance in knowledge of the mechanism of human procreation since the Middle Ages, which sheds light upon many previously obscure points in sexual ethics, and incidentally greatly strengthens the ethical case against contraception. See H. Doms, *The Meaning of Marriage*, especially chapter xiv, E.T.

[2] There is great need for someone to do for the present day what Newman tried to do for his day in his lectures *On the Scope and Nature of University Education*. The mere titles of the first three discourses are illuminating: Theology a Branch of Knowledge; The Bearing of Theology on Other Branches of Knowledge; The Bearing of Other Branches of Knowledge on Theology. But Newman wrote in 1852, and much water has flowed down both the Liffey and the Cam since then.

the Anglican Church does presumably believe that the Church has an authority to teach, a *magisterium*, and it appears that, in common with the Church of the early centuries, she locates it primarily in the bishops, each of whom is, in his own diocese, *vicarius Christi*.[1] Clearly the proper fulfilment of the office of either bishop or theologian will depend upon the degree to which the individual, by his moral and sacramental union with the Mystical Body, is actually, and not merely virtually, the organ and instrument of the Body itself. Just as there have been theologians who have misconceived their task as the use of their own superior intellects to correct the Faith of the Church, so there have been bishops who misconceived *their* task as lording it over the flock of Christ, and whose exercise of the *magisterium*, like that of their other functions, has suffered in consequence. But, as Fr Charlier reminds us, "the *magisterium* is not to be conceived as a mere external norm of faith, which imposes upon the faithful the beliefs that they are to hold; it is an organic function of the Church and emanates from it as one of its vital faculties."[2] It is obvious that as regards the necessity of a devout and humble relation to the Body of Christ there can be no difference between bishop and theologian. There can be only one Gospel for the *pastor fidelium* and the *doctor theologiæ*, but, whereas the theologian's work is the investigation of the content of divine revelation, the function of the bishop as teacher (the only aspect of his work with which we are concerned here) is the proclamation of the revelation to the Church and the world and its defence against strange and erroneous teachings. It is not the theologian's job to usurp the *magisterium* of the Episcopate, and the bishop is not fulfilling his duty if he offers, as has sometimes been the case in the Church's history, an undue deference to theologians who have viewed their task as the correction and improvement of the Faith delivered to the saints. Both bishop and theologian must act as organs of the Body of Christ, and the very close links that should exist between them cannot annul their difference of status. For the bishop's relation to the Christian revela-

[1] The question of the status of the Papacy is not directly relevant here, and there is certainly no room to discuss it. But in case the omission should be noticed by the reader, it may be well to mention that the fact of its existence has not been overlooked by the writer, who, however, is certainly not competent to deal with it.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 65.

tion arises out of his special position as pastor of the flock of Christ, a position to which the theologian *qua* theologian has no claim. But this will not by any means exonerate the theologian from responsibility for the evil effects that intellectual pride or rashness on his part may have upon the souls of Christian people.

Such a view of the nature of theological science as has been outlined here will, no doubt, appear to many as obscurantist and reactionary. That cannot be helped. What I would claim for it is that it is capable of defending theology from the frequent charge of being both irrelevant and academic, that it is what is implied in the traditional Anglican appeal to Scripture and the Fathers, and that it grounds theology in the very life of the Christian and the Church. And, since it may be broadly described as an "anti-Liberal" position, it may be well in conclusion to see how it stands in relation to that theological Liberalism which has for long been the prevailing influence in Anglican theology and which is by no means yet extinct.

Liberalism may be defined as the attempt to insert Christianity into an intellectual framework derived from some contemporary understanding of reality which is secular (that is, non-religious) in origin.[1] The obvious advantage which it offers is that of presenting the Christian religion in a dress which will be familiar to some contemporary minds; its hope is that it will be able to beat the unbelievers on their own ground—winning an away match is always satisfactory. Its great drawback is that the ground itself may be unsuitable for the contest; more explicitly, it suffers from three grave defects. There is, first of all, the danger that it will deform Christian truth in attempting to fit it into the setting of contemporary categories. In the second place, it must ignore, or at least sadly understress, the claim which is part of the very essence of Christianity, to be a God-given revelation outstripping all schemes of purely secular origin. And,

[1] It will doubtless be objected that this is precisely what St Thomas Aquinas did in synthesizing Christianity and Aristotelianism. But it must be replied: (1) That so far from Christian theology being brought into line with Aristotelianism, it was Aristotelianism which was very drastically brought into line with Christian theology; (2) that one of the tasks to which St Thomas deliberately addressed himself was that of clearly delimiting the respective spheres and methods of theology and philosophy, a task in the performance of which modern Liberal theology has been remarkably deficient.

thirdly, it will have constantly to change its ground, for there will be as many "Liberal theologies" as there are schemes of contemporary thought.

In actual fact, theological Liberalism has broken down mainly on account of the fact last mentioned. The two chief bases which it assumed were a philosophical tradition of a subjectivist type deriving ultimately from Kant, and an evolutionary theory of the development of religion from less perfect to more perfect forms (animism—polytheism—monolatry—monotheism), neither of which appears to be very well founded to-day. But a still more important factor has been the impasse reached in the critical study of the Bible. The new school of Biblical scholars, of whom the late Sir Edwyn Hoskyns is the best-known but by no means the only representative, has shown that the critical method itself when applied to the Bible, in spite of its many important discoveries, demonstrates its own incapacity to explain the Bible's existence and nature.

It is therefore hardly surprising that a tendency has appeared in some quarters to repudiate any rational approach to theology, and to confine theology to the proclamation of the bare Word of God as that in the presence of which all human faculties must be paralysed and no flesh may glory. The extreme example of this is, of course, Karl Barth, but he has many more or less whole-hearted disciples. Such a tendency is by no means unique in Christian thought. M. Gilson has called attention to its existence in the thirteenth century; he gives it the name "theologism", and shows how it existed side by side with rationalism until (and even after) the Thomist synthesis established the true relation between revelation and reason. The position of the theologists, he tells us, "is very simple; since God has spoken to us, it is no longer necessary for us to think";[1] and he remarks that, "despite their radical opposition, the Theologism and the Rationalism of the thirteenth century had at least one common feature, their one-sidedness".[2]

The main stream of Christian theology has been neither rationalistic nor irrationalist. It is ready to give full weight to the truth for which Liberalism has contended—namely, that the human reason is a God-given faculty having full rights in its proper sphere and under proper control, but

[1] *Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages*, p. 6. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 69.

it is free from the subjectivism and ephemerality to which Liberalism is exposed. It refuses to admit with Liberalism that the terrain of theology must be cleared of the accumulated work of nearly two millennia in order that on the bare earth of natural reason there may be erected a new theological edifice to twentieth-century specifications. On the contrary, it views the task of the theologian as the addition of at most a new wing, at least a few more bricks, to the building which has been slowly and painfully constructed, not without mistaken enthusiasms and unsuccessful experiments, by the labours of the great doctors and theologians of the past. For its material and its inspiration it turns not merely to the deliverances of the human mind, weakened and wounded by the fall of man, but to the revelation which God has committed to His Church and which, as the centuries have rolled by, has become more and more explicit under the guidance of the indwelling Spirit. This does not mean that the human reason has no part to play in theology; quite the contrary. As nature is healed and strengthened by grace, so is the human reason by divine revelation. Indeed, only in the Christian Church can the natural infirmities of the human mind be overcome and the theological intellect be rescued from partiality and error. Only as he lives in union with Christ in the Mystical Body can the theologian without peril of presumption and damnation speak about God and the things of God. For if the highest activity of which the human mind is capable is the contemplation of the Holy Trinity, its true home is the Spirit-bearing Body of Christ. It is, as St Augustine well knew, in his mind above all else that man bears the beauty of the image of God, and

> . . . in the land of beauty
> All things of beauty meet.

E. L. Mascall, O.G.S.

(*Concluded.*)

Trinitarianism and Humanism

In that rather dismaying title I have at least followed the spirit of Dogberry's injunction " to write God first, for God forbid but that God should go before such ". Humanism, whatever the term may mean or be made to mean in par-

ticular, means in general the principles, and the study of the principles, of secular culture and secular education. Its aim is the well-proportioned development of men as members of *mundane* society. It is scarcely concerned with men as members of *religious* society—that is, the Church. Properly it inculcates reverence, not worship. A humanist may or may not worship; in so far as he does, he enters the sphere of religion. But humanism as such, which should be as sharply as possible distinguished from *religious* humanism—humanism in itself is devoid of adoration, at least in the Christian sense of this word. Irving Babbitt was mistaken in stressing *meditation*, instead of worship and adoration, as the distinguishing mark of religion. He was right, however, in saying: "The man who sets out to live *religiously* in the secular order without having recourse to the wisdom of the humanist is likely to fall into vicious confusions." And further: "The Catholic and the non-Catholic should be able to co-operate on the humanistic level" (*Humanism and America*, p. 44).

Very true. But in such co-operation the Catholic believer will never for a moment forget that humanism is ever on the way towards full and complete *Christian* culture. Under various captions a great deal has been written upon the humanistic or humane *approach* to Christianity, notably in the present century. A. E. Taylor's book *The Faith of a Moralist* demonstrates that a fully humane *ethic* must have its tap-root in the Christian faith. Paul E. More's *Greek Tradition* and the writings of William Temple show how humane *philosophy* culminates in orthodox theology. And now A. J. Toynbee's voluminous *Study of History* is making fully clear that the only *reasonable* interpretation of the human story as a whole is that given by traditional Christianity. In this connexion should be mentioned Professor Douglas Bush's (of Harvard) little volume *Humanism and the Renaissance* (University of Toronto Press, 1939, $1.50). Mr Bush is giving the *coup de grâce* to the notion, established during the so-called Enlightenment and still prevalent to-day, that the Renaissance was mainly a pagan movement. He and others are proving that the Renaissance, conceived as extending from the twelfth to the seventeenth century, was essentially Christian. Many other books and articles might be cited, which go to show that in this time of disaster for civilization the Holy Spirit has imbued many scholars with the conviction that human culture, whether viewed

historically, philosophically, or morally, can have its true and full development only within historic Christianity.

I should like in this paper to concentrate on the significance in this matter of the dogma of the Holy Trinity. This great doctrine is both the result and the cause of Catholic Christian experience. It formulates that experience, and is the means of clarifying, stimulating, and extending it. No *one* individual, be he St Augustine, St Thomas Aquinas, or the present Archbishop of York (let alone this writer), can speak definitively upon this experimental and ecumenic belief. Only by wide and thorough discussion can we have a modern and yet traditional view of it. The need of such a view appears in three ways.

First: To-day many educated and humane persons who have rejected Christian orthodoxy have nevertheless a feeling, accentuated by the present condition of the world, that Christ is in some sense divine. But that feeling is vague and erratic. It can be canalized and converted into clear belief only through Trinitarian dogma.

Second: The Christian Church cannot be mentally reunited without this dogma; and until she is thus reunited she cannot regain her proper influence upon human culture. The Church created modern civilization, but she lost control of it because of the Great Schism; by which term I mean the whole schismatic movement, the total series of divisions and subdivisions, that has torn the Body of Christ during the past four hundred years and done much to wreck human society. We may easily think of a dozen *other* reasons for the present state of civilization, but the underlying ground, I am sure, is the Great Schism. At any rate we, as Churchmen, should give first place to that calamity—out of Christian humility, charity, and *strategy*. We can disarm the hostility of outsiders, and at the same time get them to see the significance of the Church, by emphasizing the *sin* of the Great Schism as a disastrous failure of charity within the household of the Faith, and as the primal source of the present tragedy of the Occident. For surely Holy Church was designed by Providence to break the fatal climax that has appeared in every great civilization so far: at the outset, a rise of religious faith; then, a rich growth of secular cultures; and finally, a catastrophic materialism. The Catholic Christian Church, by controlling modern society and modern materiality, could have broken that sequence; but, instead, she broke herself.

While still united she was able, from the eleventh to the thirteenth century, to absorb and govern a vast new fund of knowledge. But from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, with her mind divided and backward, she stood aloof from and even hostile to that further, many-sided development of the natural intellect which she herself had occasioned. Thus she became terribly discredited in the realm of culture. Of course, during the past two or three generations the Church has in large measure accepted modern knowledge, and at the same time the sectarian spirit has much abated. But the Church cannot again be of one mind—and therefore culturally potent—except in the way in which she became so at the first—namely, through the orthodox dogma of the Trinity.

Third: The modern university, founded by the Church seven centuries ago, but lost to her through the abnormal secularizing of education made possible by the Great Schism, and now serving as the most effectual means of dechristianizing the modern mind—the modern secular university is now increasingly aware that it is failing in the central aim of culture—that is, to see and teach the true proportions of human life. The fact is that the university cannot fulfil this aim without the guidance of Christian Trinitarian philosophy. Conversely, Christianity in the academic realm cannot be intellectually satisfying except through the dogma of the Trinity. To that statement, of course, the majority of our academic colleagues would rejoin with a smile: "It is exactly this dogma that renders Christianity intellectually *un*satisfying." Well, in discussing the matter with them, we should first of all (again in Christian humility, charity, and *strategy*) admit the fearful inadequacy of this dogma to its Supreme Object. Absolute truth is not purely given to man. Trinitarian doctrines are considerably metaphoric and mythological: not knowing even what *one human* person is, we cannot know very much about *three divine* persons. But when all concessions have been made we must assert that, so far from being out of date and rather queer, Trinitarianism (which of course existed before Christianity and was raised to its highest level by the Church) is the perennial and normal way for the human mind to *apprehend* the *incomprehensible* God—as appears quite clearly when we consider its two chief rivals, polytheism and monism.

The polytheist has much reason on his side; he can say:

" The fact that *I* am a single person does not mean that God is; we dare not impose this human limitation upon *Him*. Of course the divine nature is a unity. But if it is personal, and if it is also the source of the infinite variety of the universe, it must comprise *several* persons." So far, so good. But polytheism proceeds to *degrade* the divine nature by extending it to a large number of persons—gods, demi-gods, and heroes —very imperfect in quality. The ancient polytheisms were dragged down to nothingness one after another by their all too human and immoral pantheons.

But the polytheistic *spirit* continues, and will continue doubtless till the end of time. Modern man has instituted a polytheistic humanitarianism which, in effect, deifies human nature and gives divine honours, as in pagan times, to human heroes. The leading proponents of this cult were averse to the *term* polytheism because they worked under the ægis of Christianity: they were scarcely aware of their polytheistic drift. For instance, Thomas Carlyle (for whom one has great respect, affection and pity) was nominally a Christian theist. But his god was a very meagre and distorted post-script of the God of Christ; whereas his worship of human heroes, some of them dreadfully faulty, was intense, vivid and influential. He taught, falsely, that all " heroes " come to us direct from the hand of God: the only Hero who *really* did so, Christ, has a very pale position in Carlyle's pantheon. In private he utterly rejected the Incarnation. Emerson, his friend, did so in public, declaring that every hero, every person in so far as he excels, is a divine incarnation in exactly the same way as Christ. . . . Remember that at the present moment Carlyle and Emerson—not to mention a hundred smaller heretics—are being taught to youngsters in thousands of schools by teachers who regard humanitarian hero-worship either as truly Christian or as desirable for non-Christian reasons.

This modern polytheism is in stark contrast with the experience of a long line of saintly persons, pagan as well as Christian, who, as they progressed in the spiritual life, perceived more and more, with deepening *humility*, the *gulf* between themselves and the Divine Perfection. In Jesus Christ alone, and *awfully*, that gulf is closed while at the same time the humility is perfect. But this divine mystery, this uniqueness of our Lord, was and is rejected by polytheistic humanitarianism. Accordingly the modern era has been prolific of saviours: lo here, lo there, is Christ. And now in the

fullness of time—our time—has come the Christ of Germany, Adolf Hitler. . . . He is an intensely religious person: he worships the demonic element in nature and human nature. He is frankly polytheistic: his pantheon consists of "supermen" who have the non-moral efficiency, the wonderful co-ordination, and the stealth and speed of the tiger.

Above and through the present horror a divine law, necessary for human welfare, is working itself out: whenever man, in his spiritual pride, equates human goodness with divine goodness, as during the past two centuries, he will presently proceed to identify the divine *power* with the brutal and demonic energy of our lower nature. Thus modern polytheism, like the ancient varieties, has degraded the idea of God and is going down to destruction.

Reactive from polytheism comes monism, or monadism. It tries to save the dignity of God by regarding Him as a monad, a single object, far above the realm of human passions and imaginings. But here let us note one of the most significant facts in the history of religion. Both monism and polytheism tend *always* to resolve themselves into the ultimate heresy, pantheism. For the polytheist, badly humanizing God by assimilating His nature to human nature, makes Him disappear *into* His creation; while the monist, badly *de*humanizing God so that He becomes remote and unbelievable, makes Him disappear *behind* His creation. In either case the blank universe remains, identical with, or in place of, God.

All these tendencies appear in Emerson, whose mind was a wonderful æolian harp hung up in the winds of modern doctrine (his "self-reliance", in its philosophic substance, was "made in Germany"). Noble in character (mainly because of his Christian heritage), he shrank instinctively from the *immorality* inherent in polytheistic humanitarianism, and swung over towards monism; but this, in its chill aloofness, impelled him in the opposite direction; and, oscillating between these two extremes, his mind had a constant drift to pantheism. I think the most *human* feature of Emerson was his continual sense of the *in*humanity of his own spiritual thought. He felt and bemoaned that fact, but never once, so far as I know, did he put his finger on the cause of it, which was that, like many other of the great geniuses of his era (and largely owing to the Great Schism), he had lost hold of the sole way of conceiving God so as

to realize both His complete humanity and His transcendent perfection—namely, the dogma of the Holy Trinity.

All our thinking on this matter must go back to St Paul, who was impelled by his Catholic religious *experience* (*not* by theorizing) to distinguish the *love* of God the Father, the *grace* of Christ, and the *fellowship* of the Holy Spirit.

As to the First Person: Since all God's virtues and values are merely aspects of His perfect Love, God as Love is, in the first place, God as perfection—perfection of, in, and for itself. But if this were the *whole* truth about the Divine Being, we imperfect creatures could have no real relation to Him. There would be nothing that we could do for Him; and nothing that He could do for us, ultimately, except reabsorb us into that perfect being of His from which we have, so unaccountably, emerged. This " divine cessation " of us as individual and real persons *must* be the end of man according to monistic theory and monistic mysticism. But this blind alley is refused by Christianity, which perceives our eternal distinction from, and relation to, God through the Second and Third Persons of the Trinity.

At this juncture, however, a modern humanist might deliver himself as follows: " While I find myself in general agreement with what has been said, and am quite willing to call myself a Christian Trinitarian, I must insist on one proviso. I cannot possibly believe that the Persons of the Trinity *exhaust* the Divine Nature: surely it is something more than they, something ever on beyond them. This was not felt by the original framers of the orthodox dogma because they were confined by the matter-of-fact Occidental mentality. They were not acquainted, as we now are, with the profound religious wisdom of the Hindus, who, while believing in the Hindu trinity (Brahmā, Vishnu, Shiva) as valid so far as it goes, perceive above and ever beyond those three personal gods the vast, universal being of Brahmā, or Brahman. *We* ought to adopt this idea, thereby making the Christian dogma really more catholic. While affirming that the Christian Trinity is far superior to the Hindu trinity, we should admit that it, too, cannot fully comprise Brahmā, the transcendent or essential God."

The reply is as follows: Either Brahmā is Divine Love, in which case he is a synonym of God the Father, or Brahmā is something *less* than Divine Love and is, in so far, an abstraction. As a matter of fact Brahmā is, at best, the Moral Law or the Higher Will, which is a noble abstraction from

the complete life of God and of man. Christianity is based upon the solid, everyday fact that life, whatever else it may be, is essentially love. The hardest-hearted Philistine of our acquaintance loves his wife and children, perchance, at any rate his business, his golf, his automobile and (I hope) his dog. Wherever there is any vitality worth mentioning there is love. Vital growth is the continual conversion (not sublimation but conversion) of love to higher levels and higher kinds of love. The saying "Ye shall be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect" means: your goal is that life of love which is perfect in truth, beauty, goodness, in all virtues and values whatsoever.

But meantime human love, always imperfect, is often gross and wicked, and, at worst, flatteringly and viciously deceptive. Humanism, I think, may be particularly defined as "a criticism of love". The humanist as such (that is, without turning and becoming as a little child) cannot possibly believe that God is Love; which, as the late Charles Gore remarked, is the only really difficult dogma in religion. For the humanist, unlike the saint, has only a meagre personal experience of self-sacrificing love, while at the same time he has a very wide and sharp knowledge of the *sins* of love. Consequently humanism, even when (as in Plato and Buddha) it is deeply imbued with the religious spirit and therefore aware of the great value of love, cannot know, can never know, that Love is the central fact of life and of the universe. The proper function of humanism is to criticize and to improve human love by stressing all the virtues that love ought to have. A proper function of Christianity (one which the Church set out to fulfil but has been desperately hampered in fulfilling by the Great Schism) is to absorb humanism. We must say of humanism what the New Testament says of the old Hebrew Law: it is a schoolmaster to bring us to Christ—but not one jot or tittle of it shall pass away till all of it be fulfilled.

The wisdom of the East is moonlight to the sunlight of Christ (hence the inspired and prophetic story of the Wise Men of the East and the Christ Child). The Orient, lacking the full revelation of Divine Love, is tragically lacking in vitality. The tragedy of the Occident, on the other hand, is *the tragedy of love*. Christ and Holy Church taught the West to love, and the West has loved not wisely but too well. Through blood and tears we have to learn, *not* to love material things and the national state *less*, but to

love them better, to love them wisely, in Christ and His Church. Specifically, patriotism will be right and helpful for the world only in so far as we accomplish the task (immensely augmented by the Great Schism) of teaching young folk to love and value Holy Church *above* the nation.

The Occident has the way of the Cross, and it has this prayer: " O holy, blessed, and glorious Trinity, three Persons and one God, have mercy upon us." India, lacking that prayer, lies under the triple curse of an immense sensual *polytheism*; and, by way of reaction from that, an exacerbated *monism* denying personal reality, divine and human, without which love is stultified; and, resultantly, a pretentious, debilitating *pantheism*. But Occidental science (in the largest sense of the word science) has achieved many great formulas, among which the following is supreme: " The Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God; yet there are not three gods but one God."

This formula means that God, being Love, can *not* be any whit more divine in His transcendent perfection than He is in His gracious creativeness and redemptive re-creativeness, or than He is in His immanence and unfailing fellowship with us. " In this Trinity " (says the Athanasian creed again) " none is afore or after other: none is greater or less than another." Certainly the divine inexhaustibility, the something ever on beyond, is associated by us primarily with the *Father*. But all that the Father is and does belongs *at once* to the Son and to the Holy Ghost. Nothing of God can be " on beyond " the Trinity: God, as Love, *is* the Trinity. We experience the Divine Love (like light) in three ways—as far *above* us; as coming down *to* us; and as *in* us and *about* us (like the life-giving energy of sunlight) even when obscured by clouds and darkness. Therefore the regular tendency of the humanist to theological *monism* (as in Irving Babbitt, along with his ethical *dualism*) means simply a failure to envisage the complete, threefold nature of the Divine Love.

Certainly the Trinity is three *modes* of God. But the word *mode*, as commonly used, suggests thinness of reality, and may easily be taken, in the academic realm, as denoting a mere *idea*. The job of the humane scholar is to emphasize the value of *ideas* while deprecating the crude kind of *love* which uncultivated people have for things and persons. Nevertheless persons and things (things in subordination to persons) are *real* realities, whereas ideas are only abstract and

instrumental realities. Platonism is charming and helpful; but it is *pitiful* when in any way substituted for Christianity —as Platonic Christian thinkers, in their full maturity at least, have always seen, and as very many of one's colleagues in academe to-day do *not* see. Ideas are secretions of Personality. Our Lord never says, Blessed is the *idea* of righteousness, nor even, Blessed is righteousness—any more than He says, Blessed is the Higher Will or the Moral Law. He says: Blessed are *they*, those persons, who hunger and thirst after righteousness, for *they* shall be filled. And again: *My meat* is to do the will of *Him that sent Me*. Righteousness is a nutritional activity of personal life.

Nothing in the created universe is more real than a person. But each of God's three *modes* has more *personal* reality than a created person can have. Therefore the Catholic Faith insists that the members of the Trinity are, and shall normally be termed, Divine *Persons*. The Christian humanist will teach the fact that truth, beauty, and goodness are not a real trinity but aspects of the Divine life of love, and exemplified equally by each of the Persons of the *real* Trinity. . . . Only with this background can Christian humanism and the Christian Church oppose to increasing totalitarianism a reasonable faith in the eternal value of *human* persons. Human personality and human society are derivative from the divine persons and divine society of the Trinity.

G. R. Elliott.

The War and Christian Reunion—II

If the post-war world is to be built according to Christian, and not pagan, principles, an immense—and a *united*—effort is demanded of Christians; and demanded, not in the future merely, but now.

May I suggest three points for consideration?

Let us begin with the individual. The Christian cannot act fully as a Christian unless he has achieved, through God's grace, unity in himself. Disruption in the personality makes action impossible. But unity in the personality means union with God. Egoism is disruptive; it takes the personality away from its real Centre. Unity means wisdom, seeing all things with the eyes of God; it means gentleness, seeing all things with the heart of God; it means selflessness, serving all things after the example of the love and humility of God.

What dissipates the unity of the self more perhaps than anything else is precisely the bickering spirit, the determination to score debating points, to see the worst in and to triumph over—in a word, to fight against—Christians whose beliefs are not our own. All these things are the effect of egoism, because egoism is essentially disruptive. If, on the contrary, we could really and fully achieve unity in ourselves, unity through finding our true humanity in God and through finding God in all things, then these disruptive elements in the personality would disappear. *Amor est congregativus.* Unity in the self is the fruit of love, and is productive of unity outside the self also. The unity between us on fundamentals is far greater, the disagreement far less, than we tend to think—perhaps, alas! than we sometimes *like* to think. The first step is to rid ourselves of the love of disruption; to substitute for it that love of men and things which is the direct result of the discovery of God.

The present war is being waged on many different levels, and at the deepest level there lies the problem of freedom and authority. It is significant that that same problem is what more perhaps than anything else divides Christians among themselves. Yet here too—and this is the second consideration I would put forward—there is a very great deal on which we are at one, especially in so far as the problem applies to human society. We must, as Christians, repudiate individualism and tyranny alike; which means that we must, as Christians, hold in common the view that freedom and authority are complementary; that human life is a life of service, but of free service. We must, as Christians, be at one in holding that the authority of the state is dependent upon, and must be obedient to, the law of God. We must, as Christians, repudiate the tyranny of capitalist industrialism because it robs the human person of his creativity and therefore of his personality. The list could be extended indefinitely. There is, of course, room for wide disagreement when we come down to the practical application of principles; we may adhere to this or that policy, party, or doctrine; we may pin our faith to this or that economic theory. But this is certainly not the time to emphasize derivative differences; it is essential, on the contrary, that we should sink these differences in order to affirm with unanimous voice our belief in, and our demand for, the fundamental things; and there is plenty of evidence that on these fundamental things—the fundamental principles of

Christian sociology—we could draw up a common program if we wished to. It really seems as if it were the will to collaborate that is lacking. But if we acquiesce in that state of affairs we may find that once again we have missed an opportunity, failed in a responsibility, and lost the world to Christ.

And what of the differences that cannot be overcome? It is no part of Christian charity, and it is no way to real reunion, to gloze over disagreements that are really irreducible. On the contrary. But the need for a short-term policy of collaboration in the essentials of social and political theory is paralleled by the equally pressing need for a long-term policy of eirenic discussion and co-operation, most especially on the authority-freedom issue. It was the view of the French pastor A.-N. Bertrand that "what divided the Church in the sixteenth century was less a question of theology than a problem in psychology". Certainly, if we were to succeed in understanding better the differences of psychological approach to divine truth in the different communions—if we had sufficient sympathy and understanding to appreciate, and be able to share in, these different approaches, instead of remaining, as we too often do, entrenched behind our own particular individual or collective tempers of mind—we should not indeed dissolve our theological differences, but we should be very much nearer a growth in agreement.

Berdyaev, in his study of Dostoievsky, makes an illuminating comparison between the different conceptions of man in Dante, Shakespeare, and Dostoievsky. For the first, representing the period of theocentric humanism, man is part of an objective world order; he is "one of the grades in the universal hierarchy"; "God and Satan, heaven and hell are not revealed within the human spirit and by human experience: they are given to man from outside." With the period of anthropocentric humanism, of which Shakespeare is the greatest representative,[1] there comes "an absolutely new notion of the world"; there was no longer a single ordered cosmos, but an infinity of worlds, the "infinite empty sky of the astronomers", and man "was lost in these vast solitudes. . . so he turned inward to himself, entering the psychic realm". In so doing, in elaborating a conception of the world directed "towards

[1] Berdyaev is, I think, unfair to Shakespeare himself, but not to his age.

its psychic and not its spiritual aspect, away from man's ultimate spiritual self", man " renounced the centre of his soul and remained at the periphery ". Dostoievsky marks another epoch, another stage. With the denial of God and the spirit, man had become a " flat creature in two dimensions—he had lost that of depth "; but when the " creative and joyous energy that marked the Renaissance " had dried up, " sudden rumblings were heard and the volcanic nature of the underworld was manifested. In man himself an abyss opened and therein God and heaven, the devil and hell were revealed anew "; the humanist " experiment in liberty was carried over to another plane and another dimension, and it is there that man's destiny is now working itself out. Human freedom abandoned the psychic world . . . and plunged into the depths of the spiritual world. It is like a descent into hell. But there man will find again, not only Satan and his kingdom, but also God and heaven; and they will no longer be revealed in accordance with an objective order imposed from without but by way of a face-to-face meeting with the ultimate depths of the human spirit, as an inwardly revealed reality ".[1] The transcendent order of the theocentric world gave way before the immanent order of the man-made world; history cannot be reversed; it remains to discover anew the transcendent order in the light of our experience of the immanent.

Let me set beside this analysis a passage from one of Maritain's essays. Writing of the *Liberté du chrétien*[2], he says: " If one considers the frightful spectacle which the nations to-day present, one is compelled to recognize this: that the spirit is humbled to the very depths of the earth. In truth, it is being punished for its own defections. It is the elemental forces of animal vitality which are taking their revenge against it, which are punishing it for having too long failed in its duties, failed human realities. There is no other resource left for the spirit but to go down, with the understanding of love, to the very depths of these elemental realities. Then, perhaps, later on, a new christendom will be born."

Finally, let me set down the words of Arseniev, voicing a reaction characteristic of Orthodoxy: " The word ' authority ' . . . applied to the superabundant torrent of grace which is the Church, sounds almost a mockery."[3]

[1] *Dostoievsky*, pp. 46 *sqq.* [2] *Questions de Conscience*, p. 219.
[3] Quoted by Dom Clement Lialine in *De la Méthode Irénique.*

Let me now attempt to draw some tentative conclusions from these ideas. (I can, of course, do this—in so far as I am competent to do it at all—only from the standpoint of catholicism; but we do not become good eirenicists by glozing over our differences.) In political life, the danger of an authoritarian régime is that it tends to make men disinclined to think for themselves; the danger of a democratic régime, that it tends to sacrifice unity to individual freedom and responsibility. Now the fundamental psychological change which took place at the time of the Renaissance, a change which is true of the religious as well as of the secular world, was the change from objectivity to subjectivity; the characteristic of the new period was, as Hegel put it, interiority—" it is now the principle universally admitted, to hold fast to interiority as such, rejecting, and regarding as impertinent and lifeless, externality and authority ". The new spirit is manifest in Luther and Descartes alike. As in philosophy centrality is given to the ego, so in religion the primary importance is given to the individual. Subjective experience is emphasized at the expense of external authority. There is, then, a religious parallel to Berdyaev's analysis of history. Arseniev's words express the attitude not only of the Orthodox, but, in general, though in widely differing degrees, of non-Catholic Christianity. But if the historical analysis is verified in regard to religion in the first two periods, it must be paralleled also in the third. The religious world also is incapable of moving backwards, of ignoring the past or reverting to the past. And the full force of this fact is seen when we consider the passage I have quoted from Maritain. " The spirit is humbled to the very depths of the earth "; there is nothing left for it to do but to " go down to the very depths " of the elemental realities it has betrayed. The spirit of man must re-discover the transcendent world in the tragic world of immanence it has inhabited. For we should remember another lesson of Dostoievsky's: that we are all bound together in the " solidarity of sin ". We cannot set out to achieve salvation in isolation from our fellow-men. The " authoritarians " therefore must seek, in deepened personal experience, to discover anew the meaning of authority *in* their immanent freedom, by making it itself immanent within them by a process of interiorization. (It would remove a host of misunderstandings if it were more widely recognized that the Catholic ideal is achieved precisely by the passage

from obedience to an external law, the religion of fear, *to* obedience to an internal law, to God's law internalized by understanding and love and consequent identity of will, the religion of love.) Again, the " democrats " must seek, in deepened contemplation of the Transcendent, to discover anew the meaning of freedom *in* transcendence, by seeing its identity with self-loss and service—" he who hateth his life shall find it ". When love grows cold, when law is externalized, then indeed there is incompatibility between authority and freedom, and the words of Arseniev are justified. But that is at any rate not the ideal; in ideal conditions the two things are complementary; they cannot indeed exist without each other, for liberty alone must produce confusion, authority alone degenerate into tyranny and make real obedience impossible.

M. Yves Simon, in a recent study of this problem,[1] has made this very clear. There is no necessary connexion between authority and servitude; and even apart from this, we must distinguish the essential function from what he calls the substitutional function of authority. The first is to make common action possible, simply. Common action must be the result of prudential decisions; general laws, therefore, necessary to guide them, are not of themselves sufficient. An authority to make those decisions is therefore essential. The substitutional function of authority is to supply for defects (of competence or responsibility) on the part of individuals. Social progress is thus synonymous with the decay of servitude and of authority in the substitutional sense; it cannot be synonymous with the decay of authority in the essential sense. Political society becomes more mature, and approaches nearer to the ideal, in so far as individual citizens assume a more and more creative and responsible part in the fashioning of the common life; but this progress reinforces rather than weakens the rôle of authority in its essential function. There is again a religious parallel. The judgments to be made are again not evident, are, as M. Simon would say, not " *de jure* intrasubjectivable " —*i.e.*, such as to command unanimous assent because of their self-evidence; but the lack of evidence is here due, not to the fact that they are prudential, but to the fact that they concern revelation, the supernatural. Granting this authority, then, if faith is at a low ebb, if charity is cold, there will no doubt be an externalization of obedience, and

[1] *The Nature and Functions of Authority.*

authority and freedom will appear as opposites. But where faith is, on the contrary, filled with fire, there will be a maximum of individual creativity and responsibility, of *religious* creativity and responsibility, so that the common life is enriched and carried onward by the piety, the prayer and holiness, of individuals; it will not seek to assume the functions of authority, but it will supply, as it often has in the past, the *material* for the exercise of that function, as when a *de fide* definition canonizes the convictions and the devotion of the mass of the faithful.

Dogma is not an excuse for not thinking; it is an invitation to thought. Let us return to the passage from M. Maritain's essay. The spirit must go down, with the understanding of love, to the very depths of the elemental realities. Let us take three of those realities: the need of bread, the need of creation, the need of God. If we look back upon the work of reason in recent centuries, we shall see what has caused the elemental realities to rise in revolt: the masses deprived of bread, of creative work, of God. We shall also see the abyss to which one contemporary reaction to the reign of reason has led: a self-styled rehabilitation of the elemental things, but a rehabilitation *à rebours*—bread used as a slogan but taken away for the sake of guns; creative work used as a slogan, but exploited in slavery to the state; a reversion to religion, to an absolute, but to a false religion, a pseudo-absolute. What then are we to do? To demand, as Christians, a world in which all shall have daily bread, but to remember also that *sufficientia non ex nobis*, that bread, too, is a gift from God and a gift to God, to be begged, and offered again, in prayer. To demand a world in which each shall have the chance of creative work, of art, as an essential of human life; but to remember that all art ought to be worship. To work for the building of a world in which God shall be, not tolerated but acknowledged, a world subject to the kingship of Christ—a world, in fine, in which reason, so far from ignoring the elemental human realities, the elemental human instincts and desires, shall direct them to the service of the Light and so to their own fulfilment.

Here there is surely common ground enough; and on this common ground we can unite—and it is tragically urgent for us to unite—if we have the will. But that is not all. We are, for better or for worse, in the third stage of human development. Since the end of the nineteenth century, which saw the bankruptcy of rationalism and the

new-found humility of science, there has been a renewed search for the spirit and, to a great extent, for God. We can only help in that search if we share in it. If we are tempted to say that we know already the end of it, we have to remind ourselves again that Christianity is not individualism; we can share in the search because, even though we may know the end, we do not necessarily know the end *in* the process through which modern man must find it. We must discover authority *in* freedom, freedom *in* authority, both together *in* love. We can help one another. Goodwill will help us not to over-stress our differences: we should not think of one another as representing simply incompatible extremes, this one representing authority as exclusive of freedom or the democratic ideal, that one representing freedom as exclusive of authority. We can help each other—I am speaking of individuals—because those psychological differences which helped to separate us can help to unite us. Some of us may belong spiritually more to the first than to the second of the three stages I have been considering; and that may well mean a clearer view of the whole picture, the whole divine cosmic order that must be re-established if the world is to be healed. Others of us may belong more to the second period; in which case we may have a clearer insight into the process through which the world is passing, and must necessarily pass, on its way to re-discovery. The two things are complementary, in the practical order and for the present moment, as freedom and authority are complementary. Reunion is not to be achieved in a day or a year; we cannot speak with one voice until we are of one mind; but there is much that we can say, and do, in unanimity if we are of one heart.

In the background of the present conflict it is the spirit of man that is at stake. But it is not at stake in the sense in which a prize is contested simply between two combatants. Life is more complex than that. Christianity is one of four combatants. The responsibility for its success or its failure rests, under God, upon us. Man cannot remain simply man; a society cannot remain simply "neutral". The responsibility rests upon us. At a time of national crisis the political parties agree to sink their differences for the time, and to co-operate. For us, there is more at stake even than the safety of a motherland; shall we do less than they?

GERALD VANN, O.P.

(*Concluded.*)

"And Who is My . . . ?"

MANY of us in times of relative peace had made friends with individual members of the German nation and had found them pleasant and kindly folk; yet from the very beginning of the war we were faced with the disagreeable fact that the nation as a whole had apparently cast aside all pretence of abiding by those generally accepted laws by which men had tried to mitigate some of the worst horrors of warfare. There were the usual outcries against "atrocities," and most people regarded them as being merely the breaking of rules which were in themselves so obviously of universal application that no one could possibly question their rightfulness.

Yet there were many in this country who for some years had realized that this was not the true state of affairs. We had seen that the Nazi system was based upon beliefs which of necessity led those who accepted them to reject the commonly-held code of conduct built up in earlier centuries upon the foundation of the Christian faith. The Nazis were not merely refusing to play according to the accepted rules; they were, on the contrary, playing strictly according to their own rules. That is to say, they were putting into practice the logical results of the faith which they held. All forms of religion—and Nazi-ism is just this—must logically place the commandments of whatever god is worshipped before any other claim. "We must obey God rather than men" is a maxim which applies not only to Christianity. A generation has arisen in Germany which has been systematically trained to regard the Race as in effect its god, and it follows that anything which is for the ultimate benefit or glory of the Race is the Right, and must be accepted at whatever cost. The individual is a mere pawn, and his sufferings of no account. In a communication from Germany, recently published in the *K.-H. News-Letter*, there is the following significant passage: "I have also watched with apprehension the growth of a callous and cynical indifference to the suffering of others. For instance, there is no sign of sympathy for the suffering which is known to have taken place among the conquered people, let alone for the British civilians who have been killed by the raids of the Luftwaffe."

What about our own people?

One of the most frightening results of the war is that precisely this same phenomenon may be observed amongst even the most sensitive of us. Whereas at the beginning of the fight we were really horrified by the brutalities of the enemy, their very enormity has now dulled our sense of reality. We have come to take them for granted, and our feelings are so blunted that we are frequently left entirely unmoved even by the suffering of our own civilians in the raided areas, to say nothing of the people under the direct control of the Nazi invaders. And this insensibility is being actively exploited in order to incite our rulers to adopt a policy of " reprisals ". I have before me a leading article in a responsible newspaper, which did not print letters sent in a contrary sense, in the course of which the writer says: " Let us here exclude all questions of humaneness and morality—they seem to be out of place in considering such a thing as aerial bombardment . . . whether it were called retaliatory bombing or not, the thing that must be settled before it is undertaken is whether . . . it would be sound policy from a military point of view. That remains the fundamental criterion in whose light all arguments for or against ' reprisals ' must be judged."

This quotation gives us the key to the whole problem. For years our people have been trained in the " duty towards their neighbour " without any thought of the " first and great commandment " upon which it must depend and apart from which it has little or no validity. The duty of helping the afflicted in any part of the world has been accepted as self-evident, but immediately there arises a serious test of the reality of our faith thousands throughout the land cast off even the veneer of belief in the characteristic teaching of Christ and return frankly and unashamedly to the more ancient law, " An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth." And we can be seriously informed that there is a field of human conduct where " questions of humaneness and morality seem to be out of place ". In fact, if we could imagine our Lord here in our days meeting a modern lawyer, or member of any class in the land, in circumstances similar to those which led to the Parable of the Good Samaritan, we should find that instead of taking for granted the " first and great commandment " and merely asking for guidance about its application in the question " And who is my neighbour?" the enquirer would almost certainly be compelled to ask instead, " And who is my God ?" " Thou

shalt love the Lord thy God . . ." " And Who is He that I may believe on Him?"

Men of all denominations have come to realize that this is the deplorable result of the modern educational system, under which the vast majority of our children have been allowed to grow up with little or no definite dogmatic teaching about the faith nominally professed by this nation as a whole. At last it has been admitted that Christian morality cannot hope to survive long after the jettisoning of the dogma upon which it is based, and there are many movements in the direction of opening even State schools to definite denominational teaching.

Yet just at the time when this advance is being made we are faced with a fresh and most insidious danger. It is the question of the national policy with regard to youth. Voluntary organizations cannot be too grateful for the interest and encouragement shown by the Board of Education in the now famous circulars which have been sent out under its authority. And it is widely asserted in this connexion that the spiritual side of man is of vital importance, not only in the present conflict, but for the reconstruction also which must follow. The word " spirit " is being bandied about to a considerable extent; but it is doubtful whether it is not in many cases mere lip-service. The wireless suggestion, for example, that the time when Big Ben sounds nine o'clock should be used for concentrating the thoughts upon the highest ideal that each can imagine, and that this would have incalculable results upon the war effort may very easily remain nothing but a nebulous sentimentality. Yet the fact that such a suggestion could be broadcast is a sign of an existing aspiration which Christians might direct into proper channels. And when, as recently happened, a council of local representatives of voluntary youth organizations deliberately inserted the word " spiritual " in addition to " mental and material " well-being amongst its aims, and this at the instance of a layman, yet another bit of evidence was added to the already large accumulation showing that there is a real desire for such advancement. But the difficulty arises when we try to make these aims effective. How is such a voluntary body of representatives of organizations of all types to do anything at all to further the spiritual well-being of young people? And more important, how can public bodies like the Youth Committees and the Board of Education do so? For there

is still a mass of opinion which thinks that it is not the place of such bodies to further specifically spiritual works.

When it is a question of grants to youth organizations, for example, many will be found to assert that they should be made only to non-religious institutions from which anything in the way of religious propaganda should be rigorously excluded, leaving such work entirely to the ministers of the various denominations. This is precisely the danger. If this should become the official policy, we shall produce a state of affairs where children are trained from their earliest years in non-religious elementary schools, their evenings meanwhile being increasingly occupied either by homework or recreational activity at the same schools, and then, when they pass from school to work, encouraged if not compelled to join non-religious clubs or institutions at which their evenings and week-ends will be spent. The logical outcome of such a policy would be an anti-religious influence equal to that of the Hitler Youth in Germany, for when the young people's time is so fully taken, what opportunity will there be for the ministers of any religious denomination to seek them out and give them the training and help they need for the development of the spirit?

There are signs that this is a real danger and not a mere phantom of a biased imagination. I have before me, as I write, a letter from the secretary of one Local Education Authority in which he says that although he himself advises his committee to be as generous as possible to all youth organizations, yet there is always to be considered the fifth paragraph of the Social and Physical Training Grant Regulations of 1939, which lays it down as a condition of grant aid being given to any association that "a person must not be required as a condition of taking advantage of any facilities or training for which aid is sought under these regulations to attend or abstain from attending any Sunday School, place of religious worship, religious observance, or instruction in religious subjects." That is one sign. In another area I find the case of a company of the C.L.B. which has become almost extinct since the war. Several causes have contributed to this, but not the least has been the impossibility of securing suitable room for its activities in spite of repeated applications for help to the local Youth Committee. It is admitted that the committee also had difficulties, but these were much less in the case of non-religious bodies, and it is noteworthy that all the press

reports of the latest circular from the Board of Education state that the Youth Service Corps which it advocates will have at their disposal all the available halls, playing fields, etc., that the local education committees possess. Meanwhile, both these and the new Air Training Corps were urged to be prepared to give not only their evenings but week-ends also to the training.

Undoubtedly Christians must be on the watch against this encroachment. And there are at least two methods of approach.

One is to work through Youth Councils and Committees and to insist with all the force we may that the policy of granting aid primarily to non-religious bodies shall be reversed. All who have any interest in the spiritual future of the nation should urge in season and out of season that instead of the attachment of an organization to a definite religious body being an obstacle to its reception of grant aid, it should, on the contrary, be a strong recommendation. We should demand, that is to say, that the constantly reiterated profession of belief in the importance of the spirit should be made effective, and that help should be given in the first place to precisely those bodies which are based upon a definitely religious foundation, whatever the denomination may be; that all possible encouragement should be given to just those organizations which have proved themselves able to provide that combination of spiritual and physical training which is set up as the ideal.

The second is to keep a close watch upon any official organization which is likely to make demands upon the whole of the leisure time of our young people. It is not enough that we should merely ask that Sunday morning should be free for religious observance. Unless ministers of religion can make contact with the youth of the country, either at school or out of school hours, they are not likely to have any idea of an obligation to worship, or even to know what worship means and why it should be offered—and to Whom. If such organizations are to be made semi-compulsory, even if the compulsion is only that of prestige and propaganda, some place should be found in them for the regular visitations of those whose peculiar business it is to train men in the ways of the spirit.[1]

[1] Since this article was written, Mr Wolfenden has declared that the units of the Air Training Corps are to be encouraged to appoint chaplains and to make provision for religious observance.

" Who is my neighbour ?" In spite of all that has happened during this latest war, English men and women are still fairly certain of the answer. It is much more important that we should now with ever renewed vigour give them in as plain and dogmatic form as possible the answer to the prior question, increasingly asked by a bewildered nation, and to which foreign Dictators as well as the purveyors of quack religions are providing a rich variety of un-Christian answers, " Who is my God ?"

H. R. Wilson.

SHORT NOTICES

Sunday Teaching (S.P.C.K., 6s.). Into this single volume are collected the late Bishop of Plymouth's three separate expositions of the Collects, Epistles and Gospels for every Sunday in the Christian year. Many preachers and teachers, especially those who have to deliver two or three sermons each week, will find these notes most helpful in their preparation. Bishop Masterman was a master of simple, plain and direct teaching, and his analysis of each subject makes it easy for lesser men to adapt.

Another collection of sermons with a more restricted scope is *The Children's Pulpit : Series II* (S.P.C.K., 3s. 6d.), edited by J. R. Lumb. This book contains six courses of sermons by teachers competent to preach to children. If the preacher acts on the wise advice given by the editor in his preface and adapts these sermons to his own and his children's capacity, they should provide him with a year's excellent teaching material.

Many are seeking to-day for a practical philosophy of life which will enable them to meet and overcome the difficulties of these times. While not claiming to give a complete philosophy, *Sons of the King* (Andrew Dakers, 6s.) at least points the way by showing how all experience can be used to the best advantage. The author, Reginald Marton, would be the last to claim that he has solved life's difficulties for his readers, but he has, in simple language, thrown light on the path which may guide wanderers to the fuller light of the Gospel of Jesus Christ.

H. L. Hubbard.

MISCELLANEA

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REVISED REVIEWS—II

Lux Mundi: A Series of Studies in the Religion of the Incarnation. Edited by Charles Gore. Published November, 1889.

Just over fifty years, and yet how many people now alive and thinking have read that epoch-making book? A great proportion of English religious teachers at work to-day personally knew quite a number of the authors of these essays—Gore and Talbot in the great world, and at Oxford Lock and Ottley, died only the other day; nor is it necessary to be very aged to remember Holland, Illingworth, and Paget in the flesh. But I wonder very much whether present-day students ever look inside the covers of *Lux Mundi*. To make a personal confession, I had never read it until the request that I should write these thoughts about it played midwife to opportunity; all I had previously studied of its contents was Gore's essay on Inspiration. Yet when I went up to Oxford the book had not been twenty years out; and the whole foundation of my own theological position, and that of all my Oxford contemporaries, was based on the teaching of its authors.

Many of my contemporaries were apt to raise local rebellions and to do a bit of sharp-shooting from behind convenient rocks; but the territory on which they executed their *franc tireur* operations was all *Lux Mundi* land. And the more I see and hear of modern religious movements inside the Church—with the exception of the young, very vigorous neo-scholastic movement, which looks to be in some danger of repudiating *Lux Mundi* rationalism in favour of a much more *a priori* and Procrustean rationalism—the more deeply I am impressed by the enormous influence which *Lux Mundi* has exerted on them; insomuch

that the newer Evangelicalism seems to retain nothing of the toughness of the old Evangelical theology, but to have been swallowed almost entire by the pious moralism of *Lux Mundi* at its worst.

I come, then, to *Lux Mundi* itself—the book, as distinct from its authors and their body of teaching—with a mind quite open to fresh impression, though expecting to find in it some rather "dated" fuel beds for the fires that burn languorously on the standardized hearthstones of modern piety. And some of it is certainly dated. Paget on the sacraments says all the things that modern apologists rely on, in devout and not very trenchant tones; but he says them very well, and is particularly insistent on the fact that not only is the whole creation in some sense sacramental, conveying higher values through material channels, but that God consecrates the material elements of set purpose, thus vindicating the dignity and capacity of material things themselves. Ottley, again, writes of Christian ethics in a manner that manifestly precedes modern psychological researches; but what he says is very good, and serves well as an introduction to the religious basis of all ethics that possess any lasting claim to attention. So, too, Talbot and Arthur Lyttelton, though old-fashioned, have solid matter in them.

When I was a young don I once thought that I had made a theological discovery. A little later it was with some profitable humiliation that I found St Athanasius had preceded me. Something of the same kind recurs as one reads this fifty-year-old volume. We who have not studied what the men of *Lux Mundi* wrote, but have imbibed their principles and set ourselves to work out the implications involved, and from time to time congratulate ourselves on the conclusions which we have been enabled to draw, should apply ourselves more closely to the old pages. We shall find that our own perspicacity is no greater than theirs was, that they continually tell us plainly what we have ourselves with difficulty evolved. You read an essay that seems, in the light of all our modern convictions, founded so largely on their teaching, rather a commonplace production. Seeing how much we have learned from them, it is not really strange to find so little of startling novelty in their work. And then, just as you breathe this criticism, you light on a passage that is quite striking, which reveals deep insight both into theological principles and into their application. And you find that these were indeed big men. The proof is, that they so often foresaw just the points which agitate us moderns, and so often threw out in passing the clue which our own groping has laboriously acquired.

What enabled them to open up these vistas, since largely overgrown, is to a great extent their possession of that in which their successors have been so conspicuously lacking—a systematic theological outlook. Most of the people who have passed for

theologians during the last thirty years have not actually been theologians at all. Some of them have been acute literary critics. Others have been well-read philosophers. A few have been historical specialists. But scarce indeed has been the supply of men capable of viewing all knowledge and experience, from whatever angle they might come at it, in the light of a comprehensive general Christian scheme of the ways of God with man. The big fundamental doctrines of Christianity have been neglected and the smaller subsidiary ones have been exploited; or else holes have been picked in the buttresses of religion by means of tools which betray a pagan manufacture and are not the tools of the *philosophia perennis*.

The writers of *Lux Mundi*, on the other hand, had thought deeply about the big things; they knew their Bible as a whole and did not mistake the trees for the wood; their thought was very up-to-date, for they were trying, and with success, to interpret Christianity into the new language of a wholly reconstituted world of thought; but their thought was Christian thought first and always, derived admittedly and axiomatically from the great religious leaders of the Christian past, who were much more deeply concerned with truth as a whole than with any special aspect of it.

It looks very much as if Illingworth, Gore, and above all Holland, provided the principal inspiration. After them, a series of flats descend, showing less originality and greater pains; we are given more quotations from Wordsworth or Browning, and significant footnotes refer to the published sermons of Holland. Both Gore and Illingworth knew the great theologians, and appear to have known them at first hand. Both, and especially Gore, write with real force. But Holland is incomparable—not in learning, but in his splendid rhetoric, his brilliant imagination, his intellectual glitter, and his unstrained fecundity of mind. Not words only, but ideas, pour from his pen in a torrent.

Gore himself once said that Holland was the source of all his notions, and that his own work was simply to dress them up with patristic footnotes to impress dullards. Just how far this was true we shall never know. But I most strongly suspect that there was a great deal more in it than friendly banter or companionable flattery. One man no doubt reacted to the other, and it was when they came in contact that the sparks flew most brightly. Nevertheless, I fancy that while Holland would anyhow have been himself, and could have ballasted his topsails with other material, Gore owed his friend a much more essential debt. Gore was always urging Holland to write a big book; but he never did, lavishing his powers rather on the task of filling the rivulets than that of creating a waterfall. His true monument, perhaps, is in the work his friends produced. All the same, it would have been both fascinating and, I suspect, revealing to

see what depth and lustre *Lux Mundi* would have shown had Holland written the whole of it himself. If he had, he might have ranked among the highest, instead of giving himself up mainly to kindle fire in others.

Holland's essay on faith is partly of its own times, but also rather remarkably ahead of them in some ways; how one would like to have seen his treatment of the problems of that whole personality, on which he insisted, in the light of the psychology which he dimly anticipated. He could foresee something of future developments, but could not anticipate their arrival. Yet the essay stirs the blood to-day, and its breadth and power give it permanent value. Aubrey Moore writes a fine piece of guarded Christian rationalism on the doctrine of God and its place in the history of thought and morals; this too is well worth re-reading. Illingworth provides a neat discussion of the problem of pain, as well as what is still a useful introduction to the special problem of his day, the impact of the concept of development on religious thought. Moberly has some wise things to say about authority, and about the differences between the Gospel, the creeds, and theological writings. Gore's own essay on the Holy Spirit and inspiration is far less dated than might be expected, and is forcefully written. All these men and their associates had a grasp of principles, and far-reaching principles too, which lifts them above their age and makes them both valuable and interesting to-day. To read *Lux Mundi* through would not make at all a bad introduction to theology for students. Their chief failing is a marked incapacity to write headlines: the titles of their essays are both unilluminating and uninspiring.

I have said something about the theological range of the essayists, in which they were far ahead of their time, and about their Christian rationalism, which is more definitely marked by several degrees than their characteristically Victorian tendency to moralism; and about their common "Holland inspiration". Two other points may be added in conclusion, one obvious, the other more unexpected. The latter is the tone of buoyant optimism, of rational but invincible confidence, with which they attacked the problems of their time. They seem to feel assured that their message had only to be stated in order to be recognized as, on the one hand, the one true Gospel in a modern dress, and, on the other, as the one rational outcome of the truly scientific spirit. This tone not only pervades the book, but is noticeable in Gore's own essay, though Gore was commonly as gloomy in his forecasts as a modern member of the Cambridge apocalyptic school. It might be said that herein the Holland of the combination rides above the Gore.

The other point is the insistence on practical social outcomes from the Gospel faith. Among other places, this is emphasized in Lock's essay on the Church, which, by the way, also contains

an unequivocal assertion that the apostolical succession extends to an authority of teaching as well as to validity of sacramental grace: the Church's " ministers form a priesthood of truth as well as a priesthood of sacrifice ". But its main expression falls in Campion's admirable essay on Christianity and politics. Both Christian sociologists and ecclesiastical reformers can read this chapter with advantage; for it sets out, very temperately but very clearly, the principles at stake on either side between religion and the world, the respective duties of Church and State, and the different aspects which their association can properly bear. Campion was no disestablishmentarian. He shows, on the contrary, a marked interest in the Scottish Presbyterian establishment. In fact, *Lux Mundi* is a great deal more many-sided than might be supposed by those who still await the occasion for perusing it.

G. L. Prestige.

A FRANCISCAN " HERESY "

Mr Burlap, in *Point Counter Point*, was a great admirer of St Francis of Assisi; was, indeed, an authority on the saint, who brought him in a steady income from royalties and lecture fees. But the Francis of Mr Burlap and of scores of other pseudo-Franciscan popularizers never existed outside their imaginations, and even Mr Chesterton's *Jongleur de Dieu* bears little relation to the strange figure who emerges from the pages of Bonaventura's *Life* or Thomas of Celano's *Memoirs*.

The twentieth-century cult of St Francis may be said to have reached its height when, in 1927, the Prayer-Book revisers gave the saint back his place in the Anglican Kalendar. I do not remember reading that any protestant opponent of the Deposited Book pointed out the dangers of giving recognition to so thoroughgoing a Papalist. Probably it never occurred to the Parliamentary theologians that Francis *was* a Papalist; that so enlightened an animal-lover should have been a victim of Romish superstition was unthinkable. But already, among the intellectuals, the reaction from the vegetarian social reformer of the Burlaps had set in. Of course it went too far, as reactions always do. Yet it cannot be denied that something drastic needed to be said in order to rescue the saint from his popularizers. Aldous Huxley, Mr Burlap's creator, went so far as to accuse the Poverello of pride and to argue that he was what certain modern psychologists would call a " power type." To some people this was little short of blasphemous, but, after reading the theosophists and the dumb-friend leaguers, one finds it difficult to be more than mildly shocked by Mr Huxley's wrong-headedness.

This particular criticism must be recognized as a fundamental one. It raises one of the most difficult of all ethical issues—can

a man who self-consciously strives after humility be said to be humble? Is not humility, like happiness, a by-product of self-forgetfulness? Although it would seem that this last question can only be answered in the affirmative, we should hesitate before drawing the conclusion that Francis, because he was humble in so spectacular a manner, was therefore a victim of the most insidious kind of pride. A man of our own age who kissed the sores of lepers and stripped himself in order to clothe a beggar would be suspected of lunacy or charlatanism. But Francis was not a self-conscious individualist, and his behaviour, so odd to us, was an integral part of the pattern of medieval life. "By their fruits ye shall know them." The fruit of Francis's humility was his mystical experience on the mountain.

Besides accusing the saint of pride, Huxley insisted that he was no nature-worshipper. Neo-Wordsworthians were shocked, but on this point Chesterton and Huxley were in agreement. The fact is that we have all allowed the wolf of Gubbio and the sermon to the birds to blind us to the real St Francis, and if we had the honesty to read the original Franciscan documents with a mind purged of preconceived notions we should probably exclaim:

> That is not what I meant at all;
> That is not it, at all.

The chances are that we should discover much about the saint that is unsympathetic to our twentieth-century sensibilities. Perhaps our most important discovery would be that Francis was not a liberal humanitarian but a medieval ascetic. The modern world, with all its hatred of life, shown in the slaughter of total war and the inhumanity of exploitation, has an even greater hatred of religious asceticism. National-Socialism and Fascism, it is true, have their ascetic side, but in these movements asceticism is a means to a worldly end and is never undertaken for transcendental reasons.

For example, Adolf Hitler lives simply and disapproves of gluttony, but that does not make him a "Franciscan". Secular asceticism is one of those "virtues" of the unregenerate human ego which derives its inspiration from strictly human ideals, causes, and so forth. "Human grace" of this kind, as Aldous Huxley recently pointed out in a letter to the writer of this article, "is an *ersatz* for spiritual grace—an *ersatz* ultimately destructive; for acceptance of human grace as the real thing: (*a*) prevents the individual from achieving, or even knowing, anything about spiritual grace; (*b*) tends to interfere with animal grace (it has been found empirically that people under the greatest and most destructive nervous tension are those most passionately interested in, and devoted to, political causes); (*c*) results in wars, revolutions and other large-scale lunacies

which end by destroying all the human values to which the individual originally devoted himself."

We may, however, agree that secular asceticism is a dangerous *ersatz* for the genuine, Franciscan (or Christian) article, without granting the tremendous claim of the early Franciscans that their founder was in all respects the " Mirror of Perfection."

It could be argued that in one respect at least he was a near-heretic. His prejudice against book-learning was, perhaps, sounder than the modern notion that universal secondary education will solve all human problems, but was it consistent with the best Christian tradition? Does Christianity call upon men to deny their intellects in order to cultivate humility? St Francis seems to answer " Yes." He is reported to have said: " My brethren who are led by desire of learning shall find their hands empty in the day of tribulation," and there is the story of how the saint appeared after his death to a friar " too intent on the study of preaching ", and " reproved and prohibited him, and ordered that he should study to tread the path of humility and simplicity ". But the tradition of Christian learning and literature, from the Apostle Paul through the great line of Fathers and Schoolmen to the Maritains, the Eliots and the Berdiaeffs of to-day refutes this false antithesis between the way of knowledge and the way of simplicity.

When Francis forbade his disciples to have books and poured scorn upon the pretensions of scholarship, he was not saying what every mystic has said:

> The only wisdom we can hope to acquire
> Is the wisdom of humility; humility is endless.

By exalting illiteracy into a virtue, by insisting with such fanaticism upon the spiritual dangers of learning and art (Francis disapproved of beautiful buildings as strongly as he disapproved of beautiful books), he anticipated the Tolstoyan heresy by 700 years. That Francis in his life created poetry as sublime as that written by any man of letters is not in question, but in the Franciscan ideal there is a peculiar puritanical exclusion of the creative side of man. The friar was to perform deeds of penance and praise, of humility and service to his fellows, he was forbidden to eat the bread of idleness, but, unlike the Benedictine, he was not permitted to exercise the privilege of sharing with God the power of creation. Among the later Franciscans there were poets and artists, theologians and scholars, but they exercised the arts and practised the sciences in spite of, not because of, St Francis.

Christians cannot quarrel with St Francis for teaching his friars to humble the pride of intellect, but they are entitled to ask how the intellect is to be used once the surrender of the whole man to God has been made. The monastic orders showed that artistic gifts can be used *ad majorem Dei gloriam.*

It was left to one who was born a year after the death of St Francis to prove that there is no opposition between faith and reason, between philosophy and godliness. It has been said that St Francis has won the heart of the modern world. But it is Thomas Aquinas the schoolman, rather than Francis the ascetic of Assisi, who is needed to deliver us from the night of irrational secularism which threatens civilization. The simplicity of Francis has been debased into a liberal heresy by the low-brows and the hearties who reject theology and oppose rational religion with a religion of feeling. Francis, faithful son of the Church, would have been appalled had he been able to foresee what sort of results his influence would have upon an age which seeks its religion in the rotary club and the Buchmanite group.

GORDON H. SEWELL.

STUDIES IN TEXTS

THE LEADERSHIP OF LOVE

St. John xxi, 16: "He saith unto him, Feed my sheep."

AMONG the various conceptions which are put forward as to the true meaning of the Christian ministry, two are often contrasted; the keynote of one is the word Leadership, of the other the word Love. There is certainly something attractive at first sight in the idea that the clergy should be leaders. There is a widespread feeling of need for leadership in the contemporary world, and a common belief that in some way or other the Church ought to fill the gap. If the Church has a saving gospel to proclaim, and if the clergy have a divine commission to preach it, then surely the circumstances of the present time, with great masses of people bewildered and lost amid the conflicts and complexities of life, demand that the Church should provide through the ministry leaders to show what ought to be done. The plea seems at first sight not unreasonable. And yet there are facts which should make us pause before we make it our own. Two stand out especially. One is the verdict of history. For this conception of the ministry has been tried and found wanting: it is indeed one of the main clues to the character of medieval Christianity, and to the upheavals which followed it. The other is the witness of the New Testament. Gifts of leadership were certainly found, and valued, and used in the Apostolic Church. But they were never allowed to colour the ideas which men had of the ministry. What we find, in an age which was no less lost and bewildered than our own, is no sort of offer on the Church's part to provide either men or programs to meet the immediate social and political wrongs and distresses of the day. The Church's efforts are directed towards leading men along a new road, the road to heaven; and its ethical teaching is concerned, not with ways and means of transforming the world

more nearly to the heart's desire, but with the transformation of human personality in order that it may so pass through things temporal as finally to gain the things eternal. And not leadership, but obedience or discipleship, is the main theme of this teaching.

What shall we say, then, of the other alternative—of love as the keynote of the ministry? We cannot surely go far wrong with it when we remember that it is, according to all the teaching of the New Testament, the best and choicest flower of the Christian life. And it is that because it is the reflection of the very nature of God Himself. God's love was the cause of Christ's mission; and Christ's love is the cause of ours. As His ambassadors, therefore, we are pledged to love's service. The qualities, moreover, which St Paul discerns in this highest of God's gifts—disinterestedness, patience, sincerity, humility—are the qualities which most of all the world is needing, and which for the most part it knows it needs. And it knows this just because of their difference from those which seem to have led it so far astray. Here, in charity, is a mode of thought and feeling and life strangely at variance with the speed and envy and competitiveness which under whatever guise supply the motive power of so much that goes on around us and account for so many of the ills that follow in its train.

I spoke just now of the *contrasted* ideals of the ministry; and, in so far as we think in terms of contrast, we cannot doubt on which side of it our duty lies. But how far is the contrast valid? What if we challenge it, and claim that what the world clamours for to-day is not one or the other, but both; that is to say, the *leadership of love*? Here, perhaps, is the truth of the matter; but there is a condition attaching to it. It is that we should think only of the love, and not of the leadership; the leadership must be given and not sought. We are probably familiar with the type of exposition of the similitude of the Good Shepherd, which dwells on the fact that in Palestine the shepherd went in front of his sheep, leading them and not driving them, and which draws a moral from this for the pastoral office. The lesson of leading, and not driving, is just; but the figure must not be pressed too far. In Hampshire I have more often seen the shepherd going behind his flock than in front of it. The reason, no doubt, is that so he can best care for the laggards and look after the lame. And, if the Gospel means anything, it is the laggards and the lame sheep, not to speak of the lost ones, who are the special care of the Church and its ministers. Much of their care cannot be provided by the priest, and he needs, therefore, to be conversant with the various civic agencies charged with these matters, and to work in sympathy with them. But whether he is helping people directly or indirectly, he will adjust himself to the pace of the slowest, and that is the office of charity.

Further, we need to remember that pastoral work lies in the

sphere of the Church rather than of the world. It is not a better world but a better Church that enlists the ardour of St Paul. The ministry, of whatever order it be—apostles, prophets, evangelists, pastors, teachers—exists, he says, " for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of ministry, for the building-up of the body of Christ ". There is no rigorism here, nothing cloistral, no withdrawing into pious cliques to escape from the rough-and-tumble of common life. But there is a resolute concentration on the primary task, which is the building-up of Christ's Church and the development of Christian character. It is not the clergy but their people who are to be leaders in the world's practical affairs. Their own light is to shine brightly for all to see; and it is to be the light of love.

E. G. Selwyn.

PASTORALIA BOOKS

It is to be feared that there may be among the war casualties a number of books which have escaped notice so far through the switching off of interest to the war. Some, alas! will be lost for good. Some we cannot afford to lose. Among these is one published on September 5, 1939—a really valuable book which must be rescued. It is *The Psychology of Preaching and Pastoral Work*, by Dr T. H. Hughes, of Edinburgh (Allen and Unwin, 8s. 6d.).

It is a very good psychological study for the pastor, written from a Free Church standpoint, and thus supplementary to the work of Hudson and Dewar from the Anglican point of view. It gives a more prominent place to sermon-making and preaching, which the author regards as the supreme act of worship, the consummation of an act of self-giving in which preacher and congregation join.

The introductory section on the basic principles of the new psychology is a finely balanced statement of the new psychology up to date, with criticism of Freud and Jung, McDougall and others. He pleads for more attention to be given to the older, normal, psychology, and warns his readers strongly against amateur psycho-therapy. In Chapter VI, however, on " Special Cases ", he gives useful hints as to how these should be approached. His treatment of sentiment is very good, leading up to the work of the Christian minister in bringing in the master-sentiment with Christ as central, so that He becomes the formative and directive force in life.

Part I is on preaching and the congregation, and, though obviously addressed mainly to Free Church ministers, Anglican clergy can learn a great deal. The advice to make the service a unity in regard to hymns, lessons, prayers, and sermon is needed. Too many services are a patchwork, switching off the interest continually in many directions.

Part II is on pastoral work, and contains good advice on visitation and difficult cases. Many will feel that the section on the necessity of securing a Christian basis for all education is the most significant part of the book. About 75 per cent. of children are outside the influence of Church and Sunday school. The Hadow Report speaks of the period between eleven and fifteen as "the age at which the powers of the rising generation are most susceptible of cultivation and sensitive of neglect". Church and nation have largely neglected the strategic point in adolescence.

Part III deals with special aspects of work, sacraments, prayer, confession, missions, almsgiving, etc.; but the last chapter on "The Minister Himself" is a fascinating chapter, and every minister ought to read it. If one is ever inclined to depression, this may lift one up again to the splendour of the minister's life and work.

Books for meditation are always sought for in Lent. We may be a little short this year, owing to publishers' difficulties. Four Lenten books for last year were published by Longmans, who have suffered badly. They all probably had a quick sale—*The Secrets of Happiness*, by the former Bishop of London (3s. 6d.), bright, breezy, anecdotal, and very characteristic; *Following Christ*, by the Dean of St Paul's (2s. 6d.), thoughtful, illuminating, though a trifle heavy; *The Path of Life*, by Canon Peter Green (3s. 6d.), another of his popular devotional books of scattered meditations, illustrated from a long experience of life; *The Potter's Wheel*, by Canon J. O. Hannay (3s. 6d.), a delightful series of meditations, suitable for a gift book to a friend.

Many who are interested in the potentialities of St Martin's-in-the-Fields will be glad to know of *The Rising Waters*, by Eric S. Loveday (S.P.C.K., 1s.). The Bishop of Bristol writes a foreword, and rightly speaks of the style as "unconventional, alive, and challenging". It is an original treatment of the parable of Ezekiel xlvii, and is absolutely up to date, though actually completed before the outbreak of war.

Escape or Freedom? by Eric Abbott, Warden of the Bishop's Hostel, Lincoln (Heffers, 2s. 6d.), is a reprint of six addresses on Prayer given in St Edward's Church, Cambridge, during the University Mission; they will be valued by many clergy as a manual of prayer. It is a book to be kept, and not just read through.

For clerical reading I recommend *The Covenant of Peace*, by C. E. Douglas, Proctor in Convocation (Faith Press, 1s. 6d.). It is a study of man's mission of civilization and its relation to war. It contains only sixty pages, but it reviews the philosophy of human history from the Sumerian age to the present. *Multum in parvo*, but for those who can fill in the gaps very suggestive.

Here are a few books to help in instruction. First, a little pamphlet published by the Church Literature Association at

4d., by Dr H. Burn-Murdock, on *Confirmation*, reminds us that the ratification of baptismal vows is no original or essential part of Confirmation, which brings the gift of the Spirit.

You : Your Nature, Your State, Your Need, by Bede Frost (Mowbrays, 3s. 6d.). This may be of help to clergy of the Anglo-Catholic school, but I cannot think that the author does justice to his reputation. It is over-simple in language and over-dogmatic in teaching. Did our Lord, for instance, teach us the full doctrine of the Holy Trinity (p. 115), and can we think of primitive man as so perfect before the Fall (p. 130)? We know the Seven Sacraments, but what are the Five Commandments of the Church (p. 134)—" the rules which members are expected to obey, in addition to the teaching of Jesus Christ and His Apostles in the New Testament "?

The Divine Scheme, by R. L. Ashcroft, Second Master of Haileybury (Longmans, 3s. 6d.). This book is a little gem, and ought not to be lost. It is the substance of a three-term course on the Creed to sixth-form boys, and is intended to supplement Confirmation preparation. It is charmingly written, and packed full of good things—one of the most refreshing books I have read for a long time.

For a similar purpose is *The Glory of God*, by J. P. Hodges (S.P.C.K., 1s.). It is suitable for members of Youth Fellowships and older Confirmation candidates. It is a brief compendium of Christian thought, by an Anglican Evangelical.

If a clergyman wants to know how to talk to young people before they marry, let him read *Anglican Weddings*, by H. I. Smith (S.P.C.K., 1s.). The Bishop of Coventry recommends this booklet by one of his own clergy.

For Mothers' Unions and working women generally there is a useful little compilation of thoughts for every day called *Martha's Prayer Book* (S.P.C.K., 1s.).

There are a number of books that clergy like to know of, either as helps to their own preaching or as gift books for laity. It would be superfluous to characterize some of these—they are known by everybody. *Ten O'clock Talks*, by W. H. Elliott (Mowbrays, 2s. 6d.), are, of course, the broadcast addresses. *Further Ten-Minute Sermons*, by D. C. Tibbenham, Vicar of Plaistow (Skeffingtons, 3s.), is the third in this series, and evidently popular. *Nine O'clock Sermons*, by Marcus Donovan, Vicar of St Agnes', Kennington Park (Mowbrays, 3s. 6d.), is of a different order. They are fifty-two addresses given at the parish Communion, and give systematic instruction on the Church's doctrine and liturgy. *Where is thy God?* by Father James (Burns Oates, 5s.), is a reprint of a popular devotional book by a well-known Irish preacher. *When Trouble Comes*, by Spencer H. Elliott, Dean of British Columbia (S.P.C.K., 4s.), is a book that will be welcomed by his old friends in Lancashire and Yorkshire, and is a good addition to his many former books. There is the same

racy style and wealth of illustration, but he is never, as Dr Forsyth once characterized a preacher, like a " bee buzzing about in vacuity." Dean Elliott has always got something to say worth while.

Laymen who take occasional services in churches or mission rooms often complain that they cannot get much help. Mr R. H. Jack, Examiner to the Lay-Readers' Board in the Diocese of Chelmsford, has endeavoured to meet this need in *Pulpit, Lectern, and Study* (S.P.C.K., 3s. 6d.). It is a useful layman's guide, and might be given to new lay-readers.

Bishop Stephen, formerly of Tasmania, has published what he calls *Sermons for Lay-Readers* (S.P.C.K., 3s. 6d.). I fancy this is only a mark of humility, because they are good for clergy too, but it would be presumptuous to suggest that the clergy might appreciate a course of simple sermons for the Church's year !

There is a useful book compiled specially for local preachers in the Free Churches, which might be equally useful for the Anglican lay-reader—*Before God's Throne* (Epworth Press, 3s. 6d.), arranged by Leslie F. Church. It contains twenty Orders of Service, ten complete with sermons by well-known preachers, and a selection of prayers.

There is certainly plenty of material to help us in all departments of pastoral work. There is no excuse for inefficiency. The difficulty is to select.

A. J. Humphreys.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE INCOMES OF THE CLERGY

To the Editor of Theology.

Sir,

It is said from time to time that the clergy of the Church of England should be prepared to reduce their scale of living as a means of solving the stipendiary problem, and that there is really no need for them to adopt a middle-class standard of life, or be themselves the product of an expensive public school and university education. No doubt there are jobs in the ministry that could be better done by priests of the artisan class than by any others, and the simple life is obviously to be recommended to the Christian when so many are unable to procure the bare necessities of existence; but I sometimes wonder whether those who say these things are aware of their implications.

I am not, for the moment, concerned with the dangers of an untutored, and consequently an unlearned, ministry—though these might well be grave enough; but let us imagine, for a few moments, what many country parishes would be like if the parson could no longer be regarded by his flock as a better educated,

more qualified thinker than themselves—and one known, by his circumstances and traditions, to be fitted to take a lead in the social life of the countryside. I am not using the word "social" in its snobbish, but in its real, sense; and nobody who was brought up in a country vicarage as I was during the most impressionable years of his boyhood, could doubt for a moment that the Church of England possesses moral and spiritual opportunities here that would be almost entirely lost if the majority of the local inhabitants regarded the parson as just one of themselves. The country parson is the father of his flock in a unique sense. He patches up family quarrels, advises parents and is the confidant of their children; and, in a number of big and little ways, presides over the school and family life of his parish. He is, however, also the friend of the squire and the magistrates, as well as the police; and I am not speaking without knowledge of the facts when I say that many lives have been saved from disaster, and young people from the police courts, by the influence and good work of the country parson. He has, however, been able to achieve this because he has been the friend and respected adviser of all parties; and it does not take much knowledge of the world to realize how different these things might be if the clergy in the country had been recruited from the uneducated and poorer classes of society.

It is impossible to doubt that some men who are neither socially gifted nor well educated have a vocation for the priesthood, and it would be a shame and a scandal if the Church could not find work for them; but those who advocate a lowering of the standard of living among the clergy may wreck the ship if they do not discriminate.

Ashley Sampson.

St Anne's-on-Sea.

A NEGLECTED OPPORTUNITY

To the Editor of Theology.

Dear Sir,

Some of your readers may be interested in this story; some of them may be able to help others in similar circumstances.

During the Summer Vacation a young priest and two university students were meeting for theological study three mornings each week for two hours. The chief difficulty inevitably encountered was lack of guidance by a competent scholar. They approached the Rural Dean without success and then their Diocesan Bishop, but beyond a polite acknowledgment of their letter they have been offered no solution.

Some remedy is necessary if the intellectual calibre of parish priests and laymen is to be improved and the teaching tradition of the Church maintained. Since fools proverbially rush in it is suggested that there should be one member of each Cathe-

dral Chapter competent to direct studies and willing at least occasionally to travel about the diocese doing so. If this is impossible, perhaps some member of a university teaching staff could be approached who would be willing to advise by post such as desire to study.

Yours faithfully,
"X," "Y" AND "Z."

January 24, 1941.

SHORT NOTICES

THE Bishop of Chelmsford has printed his share in a recent correspondence with a sixth-form public-school boy. He entitles his book *Your Faith or Your Life* (Longmans, 3s. 6d.). In his letters he ranges over a wide field, mixing wise counsel with positive teaching. It is exactly the kind of book to put into the hands of the type of reader for whom it is intended. The Bishop is a sympathetic teacher, and his advice is practical, sound and not without an occasional spice of humour.

The Crisis in the World of Thought, by André Schlemmer, is a penetrating analysis of the period immediately preceding the outbreak of the war. It consists of some lectures given at a conference of the Inter-Varsity Fellowship and is now published by the Fellowship for one shilling. The author is a French medical man, and the best essay in the book is that which deals with the relation between faith and medicine.

My parcel contains one French book dealing with a French religious order: *Les Orantes de l'Assomption*, by H. Ranty (Grasset, 21 francs). This congregation was founded at the end of the nineteenth century by Father Picard and Countess d'Ursel. It is devoted to prayer and adoration for the glory of God and the extension of His Kingdom.

Stories of "conversions" to Rome usually contain little that is interesting or original. This is certainly true of *Along a Little Way*, by F. P. Keyes (Burns Oates and Washbourne, 1s. 6d.). The authoress ascribes her conversion to the good offices of St Anne of Beaupré in Canada, though she later fell under the spell of the Little Flower.

H. L. HUBBARD.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE MONASTIC ORDER IN ENGLAND: A HISTORY OF ITS DEVELOPMENT FROM THE TIMES OF SAINT DUNSTAN TO THE FOURTH LATERAN COUNCIL, 943-1216. By Dom David Knowles. Cambridge University Press. 45s.

It is safe to prophesy that this new *Monasticon* will bring delight to many people and remain a classic. Delight to scholars, because it is a balanced and informed history of monasticism in England, during the centuries of its greatest appeal and power; to lovers of the countryside, seeking to reconstruct the life that once went on within the shattered walls of their own local abbey; to teachers, university and other, a very great delight; to those interested in the religious life; and to those attracted to the subject of religion itself, the history of the approach of the human soul to God. The chief strand in the complex history of Dom David Knowles' notable book is the history of the Benedictine Order, the entrance to which St Benedict would have guarded by the searching requirement of the postulant: "whether, in very truth, he seeks God?" That was the goal. The path followed by the different Orders differed (and Dom David is clear and accurate about the differences), but the goal was the same: to the Benedictine of the older observance; to Philip, who set out as a pilgrim to the earthly Jerusalem and then, entering at Clairvaux, found a shorter way and swiftly reached his goal (p. 222); or to Hugh the Carthusian, who, having received the last Sacraments, said to those about him (p. 390):

> Now my doctors and my diseases may fight it out as they will. I shall have little care for either. I have given myself to God; I have received Him, I will hold Him and rest fast in Him; it is good to abide fast in Him, it is a blessed thing to hold Him; he who receives Him and gives himself to Him is safe and sound.

Dom David treats in the first part of his book of the nature of early Benedictinism; of the monastic revival under Dunstan; of Norman monasticism in England and the Cluniacs; of Cîteaux and Fountains and Rievaulx; of the increasing feudal duties of the abbots, that led to separation between abbot and community as it had already to that between bishop and chapter; of the Carthusians of Witham and Hugh of Avalon; of the dealings of King John with the monks; of the preparations for the Fourth Lateran Council and of its decrees as affecting them. In the second part of his book he deals with the interior polity of the black monks, with the monks' work and influence and much else. One conclusion that emerges from his careful and balanced researches is that the monastic life flourished where it adopted a form of daily work not so different, on the whole, from what

its adherents might have practised in the world. Among a population of peasants, Cîteaux had what Dom David speaks of as a *succès fou*; later, the friars, too, would have a *succès fou* in the towns. Of the gentleness of Rievaulx to all who came to adopt there the Cistercian life, hard enough in itself, it was written (p. 259):

> There came to Rievaulx from foreign nations and distant lands a stream of monks who needed brotherly mercy and true compassion, and there they found the peace and sanctity without which no man can see God. Yea, those who were restless in the world and to whom no religious house gave entry, coming to Rievaulx, the mother of mercy, and finding the gates wide open, freely entered therein.

Since Dom David writes mainly of monks, it is unfair probably to complain that he has not said enough about canons; still, it seems to the writer that, though Dom David says some useful things about them, it is this section of his book that is least adequate. The book was probably set up in type too soon to profit by the publication of the second edition of Père Mandonnet's *Saint-Dominique*, although the latter dates from 1938 and *The Monastic Order* from 1940. The very important conclusions reached by Père Mandonnet about the original text of the rule of St Augustine, and the decapitation of that text by the letter of Pope Gelasius II to the canons of Springirsbach in 1118, are not mentioned by Dom David. They throw much light on the use of canons regular by the early twelfth-century reformers; and they reflect light backwards on Lanfranc's introduction of Benedictine chapters into certain English cathedrals, a subject on which Dom David writes with much interest. When Lanfranc did this the imposition of the as yet undecapitated rule of St Austin would have imposed a life severer than the Benedictine, with one meal a day instead of two, long hours of manual labour, and an almost intolerably old-fashioned office. No wonder Lanfranc chose rather the Benedictine life and the customs of Bec for such cathedrals as would accept them.

M. Deanesly.

Christian Discrimination. By George Every, S.S.M. Christian News-Letter Books. Sheldon Press. 1s. 6d.

This is a book which ought to be very widely read, and, at the price, can be. It is very much more important than most more directly religious books. The relation of Christianity to art has been insufficiently considered, though much more than sufficiently talked about; the recent discussion in Theology has been almost the first serious example of its kind. Brother George Every is here concerned to discuss discrimination—that is, taste—in the light of the Christian idea and in the darkness of our present discontents. He is perhaps fundamentally more

concerned with Applied Taste—taste that will lead to a proper analysis of those discontents—than with Pure Taste. But he expresses the true principle when he says that " a spiritual song that blurs the eye and muddles the brain cannot redound to the glory of God or to the edification of man ".

If I follow him correctly, he would insist first, as I should, and as I understood Mr Lewis to do in his contribution in the December number, on the separation of our artistic from our theological judgment. They may both admire; they may both denounce; they may disagree. But they are separate decisions. Brother George, in recommending to the laity " the improvement of standards of Christian discrimination ", speaks of " the co-ordination between their secular education and their theological principles ". We cannot begin to co-ordinate properly until we have clarified our capacities of judgment. Among Christians it is clear that there are very many who accept unspeakable art or scholarship because the theme is Christian. M. de Rougemont's *Passion and Society* provides a recent instance. The theme was noble; the moral was edifying; but the literary criticism was (frankly) nonsense.

The only way in which we can be prepared for good style is by submitting ourselves to good style. It is a Christian duty to do so; it is always a Christian duty to prefer, in any single judgment, the better to the worse. In that sense (and in that sense alone) it is our duty to prefer an efficient attack on Christianity to an inefficient, even if, for theological reasons, we burn the first and spare the second. What we need is a number of instructed Christians who can, in judging a work artistically, whether Christian or non-Christian, treat Christianity as an element in the whole. The more instructed, the more they will know whether the Christianity in it is sound or unsound. It is likely that this will affect the whole. But Swinburne's sonnet on the King of Naples beginning " Go down to hell " is no less good because Swinburne did not, we understand, believe in hell. There are different categories of good, and it is our duty not to confuse the categories.

There are, of course, points in Brother George Every's book with which I should disagree. I think Browning a great deal more subtle and macabre than he suggests; and, much as I admire Crabbe, I do not think he is more interesting than Pope, unless in the fact that he told stories. And I darkly suspect Brother George of distrusting the great Romantic vision. But I must thank him for the book—and for the reference to myself; and I hope many others will thank him for the one—if not for the other.

CHARLES WILLIAMS.

Stoic, Christian and Humanist. By Gilbert Murray. Allen and Unwin. 5s.

Any book by Gilbert Murray will always be easy and good reading, written in his charming and persuasive style, with the faint flavour of Attic honey clinging to it. This slim volume contains four essays, and an interesting and revealing introduction; the four essays are on Pagan Religion and Philosophy at the Time of Christ, The Stoic Philosophy, The Conception of Another Life—all of which I could remember reading before—and What is Permanent in Positivism, which was new to me. I could wish that the author had seen fit to publish again, and include his *Religio Grammatici*, which always seemed to me one of his most inspiring utterances, and which would go well with the other essays in this book.

It is an interesting and rather sad little book. Murray is an admirer of positivism, and while he overrates (in my opinion) the Stoic achievement, he does not understand Christianity; one feels that he has never tried to increase his knowledge of it or study it sympathetically since his undergraduate days. Reading it I felt as if I were entering some trim, old-fashioned room, beautifully neat and ordered, with the smell of *pot-pourri* about it; could it really be that so recently, only a few years ago, we were feeling so complacently assured that all that was needed was greater knowledge, more toleration, a little more gentle coaxing of the natural goodness of mankind? Yet it is so. For some two or three generations we had been living on capital, trying to keep up a system of ethics based on Christianity, without the bother and trouble and constant effort needed to keep up Christian faith. An average reader, who did not know much of ancient history, picking up this volume would get the impression that Christianity came along at a time when culture was already a little decadent and losing nerve, and that its preachers and promoters, by a skilful synthesis, combined all the right ingredients in a mixture which could appeal to the L.C.D. of the Empire. It would not be easy to gather from these pages that Plato was the father of Totalitarianism, that Marcus Aurelius could indulge in wishful thinking, or that Christians such as Origen and Augustine had absorbed and carried on the best of ancient thought.

Murray suffers not so much from a bias against Christianity as from a lack of sympathy. The reasons for that are very interesting, and are set out in the first pages of this book, which are autobiographical. Both at school and at the university he found that " the rather conventional clergymen who formed the majority of my teachers were not very inspiring, not people to whom one could talk freely of serious things ". That is a good reason, and one to make a Christian humble. Christianity is a life and a light. How many masters at school, how many teachers at a University or College . . . ? And Murray pays a tribute to Gore, in whom he discovered that " extreme orthodoxy was

compatible, not merely with great charm and intellectual power, but with a most sensitive humanity and generosity of outlook". But the harm was done, and Murray could never return to Christianity, or study it sympathetically, or keep his knowledge of it up to date.

In some parts of the book he seems to me too ready to accept as facts what are really only hypotheses, and to indulge in some rather easy thinking. It is at least doubtful whether Pliny's truly "magnificent phrase" *deus est mortali iuvare mortalem* is not his own, rather than taken from some anonymous Greek Stoic. And an instructive example of this rather loose thinking occurs on p. 29, where we are assured (on the authority of Professor Toynbee) that when Jesus said, "The foxes have holes, and the birds of the air have nests . . .", He is only "repeating the old aching cry of the dispossessed peasant in the very words uttered long before by Tiberius Gracchus". Now the only proof we possess that Tiberius Gracchus ever uttered these words is that they are given by Plutarch. But Plutarch's *Lives* are, at their earliest dating, possibly contemporaneous with the latest of the Synoptists, and probably some ten or fifteen years later. Can we really be so sure that Plutarch was not borrowing from the Gospel tradition? Those who adopt high critical methods with the Gospels must allow the same methods to be used on Plutarch. Similarly, it is assumed we know more about the content and ceremonials of the later mystery religions than is certain; much "reconstruction" is often taken by scholars as ascertained fact. For myself I must confess to finding the greatest appeal in Murray's account of Stoicism, a beautiful and sensitive thing. But interesting as the volume is, any reader who does not know the ancient historical background well should be warned that Murray's is not the only possible account, or indeed the most likely.

M. P. Charlesworth.

Evolution and Christian Belief. By T. G. Edwards. S.P.C.K. 4s.

It is very doubtful whether a satisfactory book of this size and on this topic could be written except by someone with a much surer touch both in science and in the history of theology than the writer of that under review. While not positively wrong on any major point, if his basic assumptions are granted, the expression of his views is so often blurred in style that the book—in the present reviewer's opinion—is calculated rather to confuse and bewilder the "man in the street" than to enlighten him. For example, although Canon Edwards quite rightly emphasizes the continuity of social evolution with biological evolution, and draws the proper conclusions of tempered long-term optimism from it, he has to have a hit at "progress" (p. 55), probably lured out of his way by Dean Inge's essays, which he has not had

the strength of mind to reject. Again, around p. 71, he has not thought out what exactly can be meant by terms such as " higher " and " lower " as applied to the phyletic series, the Aristotelian *scala naturæ*, and hence he cannot clearly reach the concept of religion as the integrating factor in systems of high organization. Little but harm can come from assuring the general reader (on p. 115) that " for the biologist, the unit is not the individual but the race ". And such examples could be indefinitely multiplied.

As far as biology is concerned there are no mistakes, but on the sociological side the book is more open to criticism, and indeed unfit for wide circulation. For example, if we wish to rise above the level of arguments conducted in the daily newspapers, we must first of all seek to grasp clearly the views of those with whom we disagree, no matter whether we are Christians or Moslems, Marxists or Confucians. Hence it is quite astonishing that Canon Edwards should identify Marxist philosophy with mechanical materialism (pp. 3, 135), when those who support it have spent half their time in fighting this form of materialism, to which they are, they say, as much opposed as to philosophic idealism and other forms of spiritualism and super-naturalism. The point is rather important, since Marxism claims to be scientific socialism—*i.e.*, socialism based on the findings of science regarding the nature and origin of man. And this is the subject which Canon Edwards is supposed to be talking about.

If we are looking for a good modern book by a Christian theologian about biological and sociological evolution in relation to religion, then this is definitely not it.

JOSEPH NEEDHAM.

MIDDLE ENGLISH SERMONS EDITED FROM B.M. MS. ROYAL 18B. xxiii. By Woodburn O. Ross. Early English Text Society, Original Series, No. 209. Oxford University Press. 30s.

This collection of Middle English Sermons, edited by Professor W. O. Ross, of Wayne University, Detroit, for the Early English Text Society, is contained in B.M. Ms. Royal 18B xxiii. This MS. had already been examined by Professor G. R. Owst, when he was writing his well-known book on *Preaching in Medieval England*, but it is possible now for the first time, with the aid of Professor Ross's introduction and notes, to estimate in detail the value of the collection for the study of the medieval sermon. The earlier sermons, in Latin, are for the most part, if we except men of genius like Augustine and Bernard, hard to read without an effort or a special purpose. The mass of vernacular and Latin sermons which have come down from the great age of popular preaching and are associated with the activity of the Mendicant Orders open out to us a different world, the world of everyday life, rich in humour and traditional wisdom, the precursor of the

familiar world of Shakespeare. In these sermons, to quote Professor Owst's *Literature and Pulpit in Medieval England*, is set forth "the long, tangled, vivid story of pains and pleasures, habits, efforts, ambitions, complaints, arguments, excuses, threats, and subtle scheming that daily life involves". Characteristic of such sermons is the use of *exempla*, drawn from the lives of the saints and other sources. The foundation of the study of these popular stories was laid by J. Th. Welter in his brilliant book *L'Exemplum dans la Littérature religieuse et didactique du Moyen Âge*.

The social historian can search the sermons which we are now considering for homely and lively details, for material he can use in painting a picture of how men and women lived in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, which formed the prelude to the modern world. The student of medieval religion enriches his knowledge of the way in which these preachers tried to teach ordinary people their duty to God and their neighbour, the meaning of God's love to them in the Incarnation and in the Passion, and the certainty of judgment hereafter. They set out the works of corporal and spiritual mercy, the meaning of the Ten Commandments and of the Seven Sacraments; they expound the Lord's Prayer, "the best prayer that ever was made, for Christ Himself made it and taught it to all Christian men"; they tell, with frightful examples, how perilous it is to receive the Blessed Sacrament unworthily at the Easter Communion. The teaching about the Sacrament is simple and direct: "For all those that amend them in this life here, Christ, that is King over all kings, shall this day marvellously quicken them, for He shall feed them with His own Flesh and His Blood, saying to them on this manner: *Accipite et comedite ; hoc est corpus meum*. . . . And right the same Body that died on the cross and this day rose very God and man, the same Body is in the Sacrament on the altar in form of bread". To the outward eye, the Host is but a little bread, "but it is no bread but God's own Flesh and His Blood". It is not for lewd men to question, but to accept what Holy Church teaches. It is hardly necessary to say that there are sermons devoted to the praise of the Blessed Virgin, after the fashion set by Bernard of Clairvaux. The exposition of her virtues provided just the material needed for instruction and admonition.

In his excellent introduction, Professor Ross shows that these sermons were collected, probably at Oxford, for the use of preachers, that they belong, roughly, to the years 1378-1417, although the MS. itself is a copy made about the middle of the fifteenth century. He gives a very useful account of the structure of the sermons, which belong, for the most part, to the "modern" or "university" type.

The text is so admirably edited that it is a pity to have to make the criticism that the Latin quotations in it are sometimes

wanting in accuracy. On p. 132 the quotation is from a very well-known source, the *Lauda, Sion*, of St Thomas, and the second line should read *sorte tamen inequali*, and not *forte tum in equali*, which is unintelligible. Corrections appear to be necessary on pp. 186, 188 (*croceum, fetida*); p. 206 (*confiteri, tanta*); p. 214 (*periissemus*); p. 216 (*penitencia*); p. 240 (*gracia*). Several emendations seem necessary in the *exemplum* on p. 65. Two other small points should perhaps be mentioned. Strabo is not now regarded as the author of the *Glossa Ordinaria*, and the *Meditationes Vitæ Christi* are no longer ascribed to Bonaventura.

F. J. E. Raby.

Scholasticism and Politics. By Jacques Maritain. Centenary Press. 10s. 6d.

This book, which the wrapper describes as " based on," and which the foreword says " contains the text of," a series of lectures given in the United States during the autumn of 1938, largely consists of translations, slightly modified and in some cases drastically shortened, of papers which have already appeared in French in *Questions de Conscience* and *Quatre Essais sur l'Esprit*. They are of no less value for that, but one result is that the book is much less homogeneous and closely-knit than its title might suggest.

Five of the chapters (I, III, IV, VIII and IX) deal definitely and explicitly with politics. In them the thesis of the earlier work *True Humanism* (*Humanisme Intégral*, 1936) is developed and emphasized. No valid system of society can be built up except on the basis of a theocentric, as opposed to an anthropocentric, humanism—that was the contention of *True Humanism*. Men and women must be treated as persons and not as mere individuals—this is the theme of the present book; but M. Maritain is not content to make this assertion into a catch-phrase. Arguing as a strict Thomist, he elicits the content of the notion of personality, and shows how it involves a doctrine of society. " The end of society is its *common good*, the good of the body politic," is the Christian answer to economic individualism and *laissez-faire*. " But . . . the good of the body politic is a common good of *human persons* " is the Christian answer to all forms of totalitarianism and State idolatry (p. 69). Ancillary to these chapters is that on " The Thomist Idea of Freedom," in which the contrast between freedom of choice and freedom of spontaneity is shown to be fundamental to any authentic doctrine of man and his acts.

" Freudianism and Psychoanalysis " will be for many readers perhaps the most illuminating chapter in the book. M. Maritain distinguishes between three aspects of Freudianism and passes judgment on each. Freud appears to him to be in psychoanalytic method a genius, in psychology a very valuable psychologist

largely led astray by a false metaphysic, and in philosophy almost under an obsession (*à peu près comme un obsédé*) (p. 145). Would that all Anglicans who have read Freud had been as discerning !

The chapter on " Action and Contemplation," which suffers much from abbreviation, is of the first importance. Christian, as distinct from pagan, contemplation is not the business of an intellectual aristocracy, supported by a proletariate of slaves, but of every human soul, though not all are called to it in its starkest and most specialized form. Its concern is not the perfection of the contemplator, but the love of the God who is contemplated. It proceeds from supernatural charity, and all true Christian action is rooted in it and overflows from it. " Action . . . springs from the superabundance of contemplation " (p. 182). What did M. Maritain's American audience make of this, one wonders !

The remaining chapter, on " Science and Philosophy," contains a penetrating discussion of logical positivism and the *Wiener Kreis*.

Like most recent translations of M. Maritain, this work suffers from unnecessary Gallicisms, which in places are positively misleading. P. 16, l. 3, " desire of nature " means " natural desire "; p. 40, l. 7, " composes " means " combines "; p. 61, note 1, l. 9, " achievement " means " delimitation "; p. 77, l. 18, " sentiment " means " feeling "; p. 82, l. 27, " terms " means " ends "; p. 159, l. 15, " simplified " means " over-simplified "; p. 161, l. 20, " polymorphous perverse " means " a polymorphous pervert "; p. 184, l. 24, " shame " is a misprint for " shams "; and on p. 6, l. 27, the omission of a comma after " contrary " has completely reversed the meaning of a key-sentence. Also, all the references to *True Humanism* in the notes are given without the page.

But, to conclude, once again the Centenary Press has put all English-speaking students of theology and politics in its debt by the provision of a work of the greatest importance and interest.

E. L. Mascall.

Church, State and Christian Society at the Time of the Investiture Contest. By Gerd Tellenbach, Professor in the University of Giessen. Translated by R. F. Bennett. Blackwell. 12s. 6d.

This remarkably skilful translation (by a Fellow of Magdalene College, Cambridge, now on military service) of Professor Tellenbach's *Libertas : Kirche und Weltordnung im Zeitalter des Investiturstreites* (1936) is a welcome addition to the series of Studies in Medieval History under the general editorship of Mr Geoffrey Barraclough.

The central thesis of the work is that the Hildebrandine Reform

Movement—for English historians have learnt from Dr Z. N. Brooke to call it by this name, rather than to speak only of "the Investiture Contest"—was in its essence "a struggle for right order in the world". In the words of the late Professor Whitney, it was "an attempt to study"—and to revalue—"human society and to arrange its parts in the light of Christianity and Christian law". For Gregory VII, the age-old Catholic ideas of righteousness (*justitia*), a Christian hierarchy (*ordo*), and a proper standing for everyone before God and man (*libertas*), were the core of religious experience, and their realization the purpose of life here on earth. *Libertas*, in its medieval meaning, signified the preservation to everyone of his own *ordo* and *dignitas*, each man's *libertas* being guaranteed by the Law of Nature: and "law" signified the sum of individual *libertates*, and "privilege" the written formulation of a *libertas*. So, also, *libertas ecclesiæ* meant that which (to the mind of Gregory) was justly the Church's own: freedom from secular duties and secular interference, but also freedom to carry out her mission, namely, the conversion —and consequently the overlordship—of the world.

The pontificate of Gregory VII marked the official rejection of the venerable Christian tradition of withdrawal from the world, and the official adoption of the not less venerable Christian tradition of the conversion of the world by the priesthood. But his opponents also, according to their lights, stood for "right order in the world", and regarded Gregory as attempting to subvert it: and it has certainly to be admitted that Gregory was bent on the destruction of the hitherto dominant regime in Church and State, and determined to deprive royal dominion over the Church—whether beneficial or prejudicial in its operation—of the divine and sacramental character which for centuries had been attributed to it even by the most orthodox Churchmen. He was, in fact, a revolutionary innovator, "der grosse Anfanger, der auf sich selbst allein steht" (Caspar). Professor Tellenbach is wrong in implying that Gregory's views were always fixed and consistent, and the suggestion (p. 125) that, as a result of the settlement of the Investiture Contest, the lay princes were driven out of the ecclesiastical sphere and free canonical election everywhere established, is, to say the least of it, misleading. But he is on safer ground when he declares that "Gregory stands at the greatest—from the spiritual point of view perhaps the only—turning-point in the history of Catholic Christendom"; and his work supplies an illuminating commentary on this judgment. Mr Bennett has added a learned and lucid introduction which the reader will find extremely helpful.

CHARLES SMYTH.

THE QUEST FOR PEACE, by William E. Rappard. Harvard University Press: distributed in England by the Oxford University Press. 22s. 6d.

This is a most melancholy book, and should be read especially by those who still nurse the illusions of liberalism. It should be read, no less, by Christian realists; for the book is an overwhelming demonstration, in the realm of politics, of modern man's fatal genius for cutting his own throat. The author marshals his facts dispassionately and objectively, only to create a realization all the more intense of Europe's determination to commit suicide. From the Paris Conference in 1919 to the final tragic farce of the Disarmament Conference in 1935, we see proud European man, wrapping himself in illusion, making straight for the slaughter-house of 1939- ? This book is a terrible mouthful for the Liberal and Modernist to swallow. It will strain even their gigantic throat to the very uttermost. It is an ample confirmation of Freud's thesis, that man is motivated by the will-to-die. You can hear Europe saying: "I'll be damned before I'm saved."

The book is a rapid, selective review of European politics between the two wars. It begins with the emergence of organized peace as a war aim which was theoretically and potentially achieved in the League Covenant. Then followed the various attempts to make concrete and workable the many devices for the pacific settlement of international disputes which the Covenant had set up. Among these devices were the Geneva Protocol of 1924, the Locarno Treaties of 1925, the Kellogg Pact, and the General Act of 1928, not one of which ever came into real operation. Besides these special *ad hoc* attempts to curb the monstrous egotism of collective man, there was the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. Then followed the tragic farce of disarmament. There was the immense preparation for the Conference itself in the work of the Permanent Advisory Commission on which the military gentlemen were supreme; the Temporary Mixed Commission, where the politician and the economist dominated; and the Preparatory Commission, which began the specific preparation of the agenda in 1926 for the Conference in 1932. The Conference itself, which fizzled out in 1935, was a dreadful spectacle of stupidity, cynicism, greed, and sheer, utter materialism.

This whole period is profoundly instructive from the theological point of view.

First, it exhibits liberal illusion at its sentimental worst, which reached monumental idiocy in the Kellogg Pact. Mr Kellogg was a successful American business man turned statesman, and with an innocence and ignorance which were really sublime he rushed into the tropical undergrowth of Europe's suspicion, egotism and will-to-power—*with a formula!* Pills for earthquakes! Voltaire once said that a magical formula can

most effectively destroy a flock of sheep, if the formula be accompanied by a sufficient quantity of arsenic. Mr Kellogg uttered the magical incantation right enough, but he forgot the arsenic, with the result that the sheep were not killed. Instead, they lived to become beasts of prey. The Kellogg Pact is the symbol in modern history of the terrible failure to realize the depth and power of man's sin. Nearly all the Great Powers, except Soviet Russia, undertook to renounce war, except wars of defence (*sic*). At the first test the Pact dissolved like a snowflake in the furnace of man's sin.

Second, it reveals the utter impotence of Europe to overcome its ancestral prides and hates, which were embodied in the concrete political form of State sovereignty. Article Ten of the League Covenant (which pledged the contracting parties to mutual military aid) was smashed into smithereens on the rock of State sovereignty, which is politics for original sin. The incredible stupidity of it!

Great Britain, for example, refused in 1920, 1923 and 1924 to share with other nations the risk of resisting an aggressor. But in 1939 she gave Poland a guarantee which involved Poland's right to call on the entire resources of the British Empire. In 1938 Mr Chamberlain couldn't fight for a country so far away as Czecho-Slovakia; but in 1939 we had to fight for a country much farther away. The exercise by man of his freedom to pursue a way of life independent of God involves him in a most cruel and dreadful necessity. This is what, among other things, this book shows.

By all means let the readers of THEOLOGY read it most carefully. It translates the theological language of original sin into the secular tongue of international politics. And the result is not pretty.

D. R. DAVIES.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(*Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent comment.*)

AMERICAN ORIENTAL SOCIETY: Walter C. Klein, *The Elucidation of Islam's Foundation* ($2.00).

CAPE: Eric Gill, *Autobiography* (12s. 6d.).

CHAPMAN AND HALL: A. Ross Wallace, *The Three Pillars* (5s.).

CHRISTOPHERS: C. Bonner, *The Homily on the Passion by Melito* (20s.).

DACRE PRESS: Julia de Beausobre, *The Tragedy of France and the Testing of England*; Ashley Sampson, *The Psychologist Turns to God*; G. W. O. Addleshaw, *Dogma and Youth Work* (6d. each); J. V. L. Casserley, *Providence and History*, Signposts, No. 11 (1s.).

LONGMANS: C. F. Garbett, *We Would See Jesus* (2s. 6d.).

MOWBRAYS: Fr Andrew, *The Tyranny* (1s.); Arthur Karney, *God in the Bible* (1s. 6d.).

Printed in Great Britain by Billing and Sons Ltd., Guildford and Esher